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LESS IS BETTER: JUSTICE STEVENS AND THE
NARROWED DEATH PENALTY
James S. Liebman and Lawrence C. Marshall*
INTRODUCTION: JUSTICE STEVENS ON THE DEATH PENALTY
In a recent speech to the American Bar Association, Justice John Paul
Stevens "issued an unusually stinging criticism of capital punishment."1
Although he "stopped short of calling for an end to the death penalty,"
Justice Stevens catalogued a number of its "'serious flaws,' '2 including
several procedures that the full Court has reviewed and upheld over his
dissent-selecting capital jurors in a manner that excludes those with
qualms about the death penalty, permitting elected state judges to second-
guess jurors when they decline to impose the death penalty, permitting
states to premise death verdicts on "victim impact statements," tolerating
sub-par legal representation of capital defendants, and eschewing steps that
might moderate the risk of executing the innocent.3 News reports on the
* Professor Liebman was a Law Clerk for Justice Stevens in the October 1978 Term.
Professor Marshall was a Law Clerk for Justice Stevens in the October 1986 Term. The
authors are grateful to Karl Anderson, Gabriella Geanuleas, and Jason Stramaglia for superb
research assistance.
1. Justice John Paul Stevens, Address to the American Bar Association (Aug. 6, 2005),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-06-05.html.
2. Gina Holland, Justice Stevens Criticizes Death Penalty, Associated Press, Aug. 7,
2005, available at http://www.cuadp.org/news/SPI-20050808.htm. For other news
coverage, see Jess Bravin, Judge Roberts's Rules of Law and Order, Wall St. J., Aug. 8,
2005, at A4; John Flynn Rooney, Stevens Voices Doubts About Death Penalty, Chi. Daily L.
Bull., Aug. 8, 2005, at 3; Monifa Thomas, O'Connor Exit 'Wrenching' Stevens Tells
Lawyers Here, Chi. Sun-Times, Aug. 7, 2005, http://www.suntimes.com/output/elect/cst-
nws-stevens07.html; Editorial, Justice Stevens Speaks, Wash. Post, Aug. 22, 2005, at A 16.
3. Holland, supra note 2. According to Justice Stevens, evidence
that a significant number of defendants in capital cases have not been provided
with fully competent legal representation at trial ... is by no means the only defect
in the system .... Gruesome facts pose a danger that emotion will play a larger
role in the decisional process than dispassionate analysis....
[The mechanisms for] selecting juries in capital cases are troublesome ...
Preoccupation with [whether prospective jurors are apprehensive about imposing a
death sentence] creates an atmosphere in which jurors are likely to assume that
their primary task is to determine the penalty for a presumptively guilty defendant.
.. The fact that most of the judges who preside and often make the final life-or-
death decision must stand for re-election creates a subtle bias in favor of death.
Moreover, the admissibility of victim impact evidence that sheds absolutely no
light on either the issue of guilt or innocence, or the moral culpability of the
defendant, serves no purpose other than to encourage jurors to decide in favor of
death rather than life on the basis of their emotions rather than their reason.
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speech identified Justice Stevens as "the Supreme Court's most liberal
member" who often is on the losing end of close votes in capital cases and
is likely to be in that position more often now that Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor has left the Court.4
Justice Stevens certainly is not at the center of the current Court on the
issue of the death penalty. But focusing on that point misses a more
interesting one. Notwithstanding the resistance of a majority of his
colleagues and the nation's law-and-order consensus, Justice Stevens's
nuanced position on the death penalty is fitfully but unmistakably
prevailing on the ground. In this Article, we discuss the conflicting views
about how to administer the death penalty that have tormented the Court
over the past thirty years, Justice Stevens's leading role in those debates,
the surprising triumph of his approach on the ground even as his views have
lost ground on the Court, and the need for the current Court to embrace
Justice Stevens's "less is more" approach and the policy consensus that has
formed around the approach.
I. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT: FROM FURMAN TO THE FUTURE
Modem death penalty jurisprudence is founded on a contradiction. In
Furman v. Georgia,5 the Court invalidated the death penalty as then
imposed in the United States while allowing jurisdictions that wanted to
continue executing offenders to reform their method of deciding who dies.
In the standard formulation, Furman "held" that states had to replace
existing capital-sentencing procedures with ones that were reasoned, not
"arbitrary." 6
Although the Court's capital jurisprudence has continued ever since to
treat Furman's "holding" as its lodestar,7 Furman has no holding. 8 It is a
collection of separate opinions that contradict each other. Of course, the
four Justices in dissent (Justices Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun, Lewis
Powell, and William Rehnquist) who saw no constitutional problem with
the way U.S. jurisdictions were then administering the death penalty9
contradicted the two concurring Justices (William Brennan and Thurgood
Marshall) who believed the death penalty was unconstitutional under all
circumstances 10 and the three concurring Justices (William Douglas, Potter
Stevens, supra note 1; see also infra notes 114, 132, 139, 149, 251, 272, 280 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens's dissents from the Court's decisions on these
issues).
4. See, e.g., Holland, supra note 2.
5. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
6. See authorities cited infra note 45.
7. See infra note 45,
8. See Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. 305, 315, 317
("[Furman] is not so much a case as a badly orchestrated opera, with nine characters taking
turns to offer their own arias."; "[T]here really is no doctrinal holding in Furman.").
9. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 405 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); id. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
10. See id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
1608 [Vol. 74
LESS IS BETTER
Stewart, and Byron White) who believed the penalty was unconstitutional
as then applied."I More vexing were the contradictory views of the
concurring Justices whose opinions controlled the outcome-Justices
Douglas, Stewart, and White.
In Justice Douglas's view, the constitutionality of the death penalty
depended on states' capacity to develop death-sentencing procedures that
kept race and other irrelevant factors from driving outcomes. 12 Although
other Justices acknowledged this problem, 13 Justice Douglas differed from
them in believing the problem could be solved. Assuming instead that
racial and other illegitimate influences were inevitable, the dissenters
believed the penalty's valid objectives took precedence,' 4 while Justices
Brennan and Marshall thought that avoiding race-tainted decisions was the
greater imperative. 15 Justices Brennan and Marshall noted other disturbing
risks as well, including executing the innocent. 16
Justices Stewart and White departed from Justice Douglas only in
insisting upon a particular solution to the problem. Justices Stewart and
White both attributed the failure of existing death-sentencing procedures to
lawlessness, and both identified a source of the problem. But it was there
that the difficulty arose. Justices Stewart's and White's diagnoses and
11. See id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id at
310 (White, J., concurring).
12. Id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The high service rendered by the 'cruel and
unusual' punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment is to require legislatures to write
penal laws that are evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see
to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular
groups.").
13. See id. at 447 (Powell, J, dissenting) ("Certainly the claim is justified that [the death
penalty] falls more heavily on the relatively impoverished and underprivileged elements of
society."); id. at 366 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("It is the poor, and the members of minority
groups who are least able to voice their complaints against capital punishment. Their
impotence leaves them victims of a sanction that the wealthier, better-represented, just-as-
guilty person can escape."); see also id. at 389 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("There are
doubtless prisoners on death row who would not be there had they been tried before a
different jury or in a different State.").
14. See, e.g., id at 447 (Powell, J, dissenting) ( "The root causes of the higher incidence
of criminal penalties on 'minorities and the poor' will not be cured by abolishing the system
of penalties."); id. at 398-99 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The decisive grievance . . . is that
the present system of discretionary sentencing in capital cases has failed to produce
evenhanded justice .... This claim of arbitrariness ... manifestly fails to establish that the
death penalty is a 'cruel and unusual' punishment.").
15. See, e.g., id. at 365-66 (Marshall, J., concurring).
16. See id. at 290 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Apart from the common charge, grounded
upon the recognition of human fallibility, that the punishment of death must inevitably be
inflicted upon innocent men, we know that death has been the lot of men whose convictions
were unconstitutionally secured in view of later, retroactively applied, holdings of this
Court.... [Y]et the finality of death precludes relief. An executed person has indeed 'lost
the right to have rights."'); id. at 367-68 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("No matter how careful
courts are, the possibility of perjured testimony, mistaken honest testimony, and human error
remain all too real. We have no way of judging how many innocent persons have been
executed but we can be certain that there were some.... Surely there will be more as long
as capital punishment remains part of our penal law." (footnote omitted)).
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solutions were contradictory. Justice Stewart believed the penalty was
imposed too indiscriminately and that the solution was "narrowing": less
death sentencing as a result of more carefully limiting the categories of
offenders who were eligible for the death penalty. 17 Justice White believed
the penalty was imposed too sparingly and that the solution was
"numerousness": more death sentencing.18
Justice Stevens joined the Court soon after it decided Furman, replacing
Justice Douglas. In co-writing the lead opinions in the Court's next five
important death penalty decisions-announced on Friday, July 2, 1976, as
the Court and the nation adjourned for the Bicentennial celebration-
Justice Stevens placed himself squarely in Justice Stewart's, less-is-better
camp. 19 With the support of Justice Powell, and with the separately
concurring votes of Justices Brennan and Marshall opposing the death
penalty in all situations, the Stewart-Stevens view held sway for the next
five years. 20 When Justice Stewart left the Court in 1981, however, the
Court rapidly rejected what then became the Stevens, less-is-better view,
and as new issues arose, the Court endorsed Justice White's more-is-better
approach.21 Then in McCleskey v. Kemp 22 in 1987, the Court decided that
it would no longer treat Justice Douglas's opinion in Furman as
17. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this
unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed."); see infra notes 25, 42, 71,
80-88.
18. As Justice White wrote,
[Wihen imposition of the penalty reaches a certain degree of infrequency, it would
be very doubtful that any existing general need for retribution would be
measurably satisfied. Nor could it be said with confidence that society's need for
specific deterrence justifies death for so few when, for so many in like
circumstances, life imprisonment or shorter prison terms are judged sufficient, or
that community values are measurably reinforced by authorizing a penalty so
rarely invoked.
Most important, a major goal of the criminal law-to deter others by punishing
the convicted criminal-would not be substantially served where the penalty is so
seldom invoked that it ceases to be the credible threat essential to influence the
conduct of others.... [C]ommon sense and experience tell us that seldom-
enforced laws become ineffective measures for controlling human conduct and
that the death penalty, unless imposed with sufficient frequency, will make little
contribution to deterring those crimes for which it may be exacted.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 311-12 (White, J., concurring); see also id. at 314 ("Legislative 'policy'
is thus necessarily defined not by what is legislatively authorized, but by what juries and
judges do in exercising the discretion so regularly conferred upon them."); infra notes 43,
73-74, 99-102 and accompanying text.
19. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
JJ.); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
JJ.); Stanislaus Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.).
20. See infra Part III.B.
21. See infra Part III.C.
22. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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authoritative. Death-sentencing patterns explicable only on the basis of
race are tolerable, the Court ruled, because they are both intractable and
endemic to capital and criminal justice systems the states legitimately
believe they cannot do without.23 The five-person majority reached this
conclusion over dissents by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens arguing that any choice between race-driven death sentencing and
no death penalty at all had to be made in favor of the latter.24 The majority
also ignored a different sort of argument, advanced in the separate dissent
by Justice Stevens (joined by Justice Blackmun). In Justice Stevens's view,
race-influenced death sentencing is inevitable only if states are allowed to
take a more-is-better approach to the penalty. Had the Court instead stuck
with the Stewart-Stevens, less-is-better view, the states could have retained
the death penalty without letting race drive its application. 25
Surprisingly, however, at the very time the Supreme Court was
abandoning its commitment to narrowing as a way of dealing with flaws in
the administration of capital punishment, the use of the death penalty in the
United States began to shrink. Notwithstanding the Court's endorsement of
broad death-sentencing schemes and the triumph of tough-on-crime politics
and policies, 26 events on the ground have vindicated Justice Stevens's less-
is-better view. Although the Court lets states impose death with abandon,
the harmful effects of doing so are convincing many jurisdictions to adopt
Stevens's less-is-better approach to capital sentencing. 27
Even so, the unevenness of that transformation and the harmful capital-
sentencing conditions that still exist in some places should induce the Court
to acknowledge its more-is-better mistakes of the 1980s and 1990s and to
begin nudging laggard jurisdictions into line with the nation's less-is-better
trend. With actual practice leading the way, the Court can now take this
step without having to answer the boundary question that may have scared
it away from the Stevens view in the first place: How much less capital
sentencing is better? On that question, time and events on the ground will
tell. Recent activity in a number of jurisdictions provides a basis for
predicting that a lot less is better. The trend thus gives the Court the
capacity to follow the pragmatic incrementalism of Justice Stevens's
23. See id. at 312 ("Apparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our
criminal justice system."); id. at 315-319 ("[I]f we accepted McCleskey's claim that racial
bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with
similar claims as to other types of penalty .... The Constitution does not require that a State
eliminate any demonstrable disparity that correlates with a potentially irrelevant factor in
order to operate a criminal justice system that includes capital punishment.").
24. Id. at 320 (Brennan, J. dissenting); id. at 365 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
25. Id. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If Georgia were to narrow the class of death-
eligible defendants to [certain categories of extremely serious crimes], the danger of
arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of the death penalty would be significantly
decreased, if not eradicated.").
26. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002) (noting "the well-known fact that
anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation providing protections for persons
guilty of violent crime").
27. See infra Part IV.B-C.
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McCleskey dissent and, for now at least, to narrow without abolishing the
death penalty.
In this Article, we expose the unacknowledged contradiction at the core
of Furman's "holding" 28 and trace the Court's resolution of that conflict.
That resolution first tended towards the Stewart-Stevens "narrowing" view,
then embraced Justice White's "numerousness" view, and culminated in an
incoherent jurisprudence that, in Furman's name, has essentially made
constitutionally mandatory what Furman found constitutionally
abhorrent.2 9 We then describe the "political economy of death" in this
country over the last thirty-five years-the winding path public opinion and
action have taken towards today's incredibly shrinking death penalty. 30 As
we then discuss, this public trend reveals that narrowing is the best
available cure for what ails the death penalty, namely, error and the risk of
executing the innocent, racial disparity, arbitrariness, and resource
deprivation. 31 We close by charting a path forward for the Court towards
Justice Stevens's pragmatic incrementalism, and beyond.
II. FURMAN AS RORSCHACH
A. Furman's "Holding"
In a five-person per curiam opinion in Furman v. Georgia,32 the Supreme
Court ruled unconstitutional the death-sentencing systems of Georgia and
Texas. Doing so effectively "remove[d] the death sentences previously
imposed on some 600 persons awaiting punishment in state and federal
prisons throughout the country" and "nullified" the "capital punishment
laws of no less than 39 States and the District of Columbia. ' 33 Yet,
Furman's "holding" was constrained. "The Court h[e]ld[] that the
imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments." 34  On the death penalty's constitutionality in all cases,
however, the four dissenting Justices voted to uphold the penalty, 35 and
only two concurring Justices voted to invalidate it.36 The three remaining
Justices, whose opinions thus controlled Furman's effect, expressed no
opinion at all on the constitutionality of capital punishment per se. 37
28. See infra Part 111.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. See infra Part V.
31. See infra Part VI.
32. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
33. Id. at 417-18 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
34. Id. at 239-40 (per curiam) (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 375-96 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 407-10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id.
at 418-56 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 468 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring); id at 342-71 (Marshall, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-
1612 [Vol. 74
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Despite the "as applied" nature of the decision, the Justices spent little
time discussing the aspects of the penalty's application in the cases before
the Court that made it unconstitutional. The Justices emphasized that
Georgia and Texas had "discretionary [death-sentencing] statutes" 38 giving
jurors nearly complete freedom to choose between death and prison
sentences for defendants they convicted of murder or rape. But no Justice
parsed the relevant texts of the Georgia and Texas statutes, analyzed the
underlying crimes (apart from expressing revulsion at what took place 39),
discussed the investigative or judicial procedures that generated death
sentences in the three cases, or (except for Justice Douglas, who ultimately
attributed no legal effect to what he found 40 ) said much about the three
defendants. Instead, the three concurring Justices whose opinions dictated
the "as applied" nature of the holding found the death sentences
unconstitutional, not because of any specific characteristic or action of the
particular laws and individuals before the Court, but because of the overall
pattern of effects produced by the existing, wholly discretionary capital-
sentencing laws in the run of potentially capital cases.
In Justice Douglas's view, existing death-sentencing procedures were
unconstitutional because "in the overall view [they] reach[ed] [a] result in
practice" that was "pregnant with [race and wealth] discrimination." 41 For
Justice Stewart, the death sentences violated the Eighth Amendment
because, "of all the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and
1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a
capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has
in fact been imposed. '42 And Justice White concluded "that as the statutes
before us are now administered, the penalty is so infrequently imposed that
the threat of execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to
criminal justice."43
In the years following Furman, the Justices have occasionally
acknowledged the difficulty states have faced in devising death-sentencing
procedures along lines specified in the three separate Furman opinions,
each with only a single adherent and with the other six Justices describing
38. Id. at 256; see, e.g., id. at 314 (White, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
39. See id. at 315 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 413-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); cf
id. at 252-53 (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing facts but basing no conclusions on them).
40. Id. at 252-53.
41. Id. at 256-57.
In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is no permissible
"caste" aspect of law enforcement. Yet we know that the discretion of judges and
juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied,
feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking
political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving
those who by social position may be in a more protected position.
Id. at 255 (footnote omitted).
42. Id. at 309-10 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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the task as hopeless or unnecessary.44  Despite that, the Court has
repeatedly discerned a common thread connecting Furman's three critical
opinions and even a "holding" (beyond the technical one that preexisting
death verdicts and discretionary statutes were invalid). 45 Even today, the
Justices unanimously swear fealty to Furman.46
44. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 599, 602 (1978) (plurality opinion of
Burger, C.J.) (noting that "the variety of opinions supporting the judgment in Furman
engendered confusion as to what was required in order to impose the death penalty in accord
with the Eighth Amendment," and "[t]he signals from this Court have not ... always been
easy to decipher"); see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 397, 403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The
actual scope of the Court's ruling, which I take to be embodied in these [three] concurring
opinions, is not entirely clear" and leaves "the future of capital punishment in this country..
* in an uncertain limbo"); id. at 414, 416 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court's
holding must be gleaned from several "separate opinions, expressing as many separate
rationales," leaving "uncertainties" about "what forms of capital statutes, if any, may avoid
condemnation in the future under the variety of views expressed by the collective majority
today").
45. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 657-59 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988)
("Furman held that Georgia's then-standardless capital punishment statute was being applied
in an arbitrary and capricious manner; there was no principled means provided to distinguish
those that received the penalty from those that did not."); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 322 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Furman held that the death penalty may not be
imposed under sentencing procedures that create a substantial risk that the punishment will
be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner." (internal quotation omitted)); Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) ("In [Furman], the Court held that the penalty of death
may not be imposed under sentencing procedures that create a substantial risk that the
punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner." (citation omitted));
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 n.36, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.) ("Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on
a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared,
that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly
arbitrary and capricious action."); id. at 220-21 (White, J., concurring) ("In Furman, this
Court held that as a result of giving the sentencer unguided discretion to impose or not to
impose the death penalty for murder, the penalty was being imposed discriminatorily,
wantonly and freakishly, and so infrequently that any given death sentence was cruel and
unusual." (footnotes omitted)). Examples of articles making the same assumption about
Furman's holding or principle are: Vivian Berger, "Black Box Decisions" on Life or
Death-If They're Arbitrary, Don't Blame the Jury: A Reply to Judge Patrick
Higginbotham, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1067, 1071 (1991); Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who
Dies, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 9-11 (1980); Ingrid A. Holewinski, "Inherently Arbitrary and
Capricious ": An Empirical Analysis of Variations Among State Death Penalty Statutes, 12
Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 231 (2002); Margaret J. Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death:
Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 989,
998 (1978); Elizabeth Vicens, Application of the Federal Death Penalty Act to Puerto Rico:
A New Test for the Locally Inapplicable Standard, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 350, 371 (2005); see
also Brief for Petitioner at 20, Kansas v. Marsh, No. 04-1170, 2005 WL 1953798 (U.S. Aug.
15, 2005) (claiming, in a brief for the State of Kansas signed by, inter alia, former Solicitor
General Theodore B. Olson, that "[f]or over 30 years, the holding in Furman has represented
the constitutional standard against which state capital sentencing systems are measured," and
that "[i]n Furman, the Court held ... that a sentencer's discretion to return a death sentence
must be constrained by specific standards, so that the death penalty is not inflicted in a
random and capricious fashion" (internal quotation omitted)); infra note 120.
46. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 279 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(discussing "the holding of Furman, that the sentencer's discretion must be constrained to
1614 [Vol. 74
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Notwithstanding the coherence the Court continues to ascribe to Furman
and the practical effect it undoubtedly had,47 Furman has no common
thread. Instead, it advances contradictory understandings of the defects of
preexisting death-sentencing procedures. Perversely, efforts to reconcile
this contradiction have helped generate a body of doctrine that very nearly
mandates the capital-sentencing patterns the Court invalidated in Furman.
B. Furman's Narrowing- Versus-Numerousness Contradiction
Thinking geometrically, imagine a plane of human activity made up
entirely of adjudicated criminal behavior. On that plane, inscribe a circle-
like the one in Figure 1 below-that encompasses all adjudicated criminal
behavior for which the law makes the death penalty a possible punishment.
Each imaginary point on the plane represents a crime committed during a
particular period for which a defendant has been convicted; each imaginary
point inside the circle represents a capital crime committed during the same
period. Near the circumference of the circle, but just outside it, lie crimes
that barely miss rising to the level of capital offenses; near the
avoid arbitrary or freakish imposition of the death penalty" (citation omitted)); Loving v.
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996) (claiming that the holding in Furman established
the need for limiting absolute discretion in capital sentencing). Even the Court's most
conservative member on matters relating to the death penalty has affirmed his support for
Furman-in the course of rejecting much of the rest of the Court's modem death penalty
jurisprudence. Walton, 497 U.S. at 657 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (stating that Furman "stand[s] for the principle that a sentencer's discretion to
return a death sentence must be constrained by specific standards, so that the death penalty is
not inflicted in a random and capricious fashion").
47. Furman undoubtedly has made capital sentencing different today from what it was
in 1972. Compare Cal. Penal Code §§ 189.5, 190.1, 190.2 (West 1999) and Ga. Code Ann.
§ 17-10-30 (2004) (multi-page statutes) with Cal. Penal Code §§ 189.5, 190.1, 190.2 (West
1970) and Ga. Code Ann, § 26-1302 (1971) (pre-Furman one-line statutes). Other changes
include the bifurcation of guilt-innocence and capital-sentencing trials and application at the
latter of due process protections that previously applied only at the former, see, e.g., Estelle
v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (applying the privilege against self-incrimination and
Miranda rights to the capital-sentencing phase); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981)
(applying the double jeopardy bar to the capital-sentencing phase), mandatory direct appeals,
see Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (noting that although the Constitution has
never been interpreted to guarantee a constitutional right to direct appeal, all state and
federal jurisdictions guarantee appellate review by at least one level of appellate courts in
capital cases); Thomas P. Bonczar & Tracy L. Snell, Capital Punishment 2002, Bureau of
Justice Statistics 3 (2003) (noting that although federal death penalty procedures do not
provide for automatic review after a death sentence has been imposed, thirty-seven of thirty-
eight states with capital statutes provide for automatic appellate review "regardless of the
defendant's wishes"), lengthy and extensive state and federal post-conviction review in
virtually all cases, see, e.g., James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 Colum. L.
Rev. 2030, 2148-49 (2000), and relatively few actual executions even in states that have
imposed large numbers of death-sentences (for example, between 1973 and the summer of
2005, respectively, 648, 108, and 223 inmates have piled up on the death rows of California,
Tennessee, and Pennsylvania, but those states carried out only eleven, one, and three
executions during that thirty-two-year period, see Criminal Justice Project of the NAACP
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., Death Row U.S.A. (2005), available at
http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/drusa/DRUSASummer_2005.pdf)).
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circumference of the circle but just inside it lie crimes that barely do rise to
the level of capital offenses. As one travels along any radius of the circle
from the circumference to the center, one encounters progressively more
aggravated capital offenses. Imagine also that particular slices of the
capital "pie" represent crimes committed by particular classes of criminals,
say, white offenders in one wedge, wealthy offenders in an overlapping
wedge, African-American offenders in another wedge, and so forth.
Figure 1
Next, imagine that each time the perpetrator of a capital offense is given
a death sentence, the point within the circle representing the criminal act for
which that sentence was imposed turns from invisible to black. If no
"capital" offenses were in fact punished by death, the circle would be
empty (all white); if every capital offense were punished in that way, the
circle would be solidly colored in; if every other capital offense were
punished with death, the circle would be uniformly polka-dotted; if only the
single most aggravated offense of all resulted in a death verdict, the circle
would be empty save for a dot at its center.
Now, along with the Furman Justices, visualize a geometric depiction of
the pattern of death sentences generated by the forty American jurisdictions
with the death penalty in 1972. Judging from what Justices Douglas,
Stewart, and White said in Furman, Figure 1 is that pattern. All three
agreed, moreover, that something was wrong with the picture. They did not,
however, agree on what was wrong. In true gestalt fashion, each Justice
presented with the same image saw a different picture based on a distinct
interpretation of the foreground and background.
Justice Douglas saw a wedge of African-American, poor, and mentally
deficient condemned offenders whom capital-sentencing procedures had
invidiously cut from the pie and sentenced to die far more frequently than,
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for example, white and wealthier criminals. 48 Justice Stewart also focused
on the distribution of death sentences within the capital circle. But where
Justice Douglas saw a disturbing concentration of death sentences in
particular social classes, Justice Stewart saw a distressingly even sprinkling
of condemned offenders in a broth of virtually identical, but spared,
offenders. 49 Instead of the expected high concentration of death sentences
at the aggravated core and a thinning towards the mitigated edges, he saw a
disturbing consistency across all aggravation levels. Finally, what Justice
White saw was white, or too much of it-a plate virtually empty of
condemned offenders, though something approaching a full plate was
needed to fulfill his views of the core functions of capital punishment-to
convey the retributive message that people who commit the crime in
question deserve to die, and to deter by credibly promising that death would
be imposed on individuals who commit the crime. In other words, Justice
White saw too few death sentences, regardless of their distribution. 50
Although the problems the three Justices identified are often grouped
under the single rubric of "arbitrariness," 51 the word obscures the different
vices they condemned. Justice Douglas's definition of "arbitrariness" refers
to selection on the basis of an identifiable but illegitimate trait, a definition
that draws upon equal protection notions more usually associated with the
48.
A law that stated that anyone making more than $50,000 would be exempt from
the death penalty would plainly fall, as would a law that in terms said that blacks,
those who never went beyond the fifth grade in school, those who made less than
$3,000 a year, or those who were unpopular or unstable should be the only people
executed. A law which in the overall view reaches that result in practice has no
more sanctity than a law which in terms provides the same.
Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They
are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not
compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban
on "cruel and unusual" punishments.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
49.
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck
by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and
murders[,] . . . many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a
capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact
been imposed.
Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
50.
At the moment [the death penalty] ceases realistically to further these [deterrent
and retributive] purposes, . . . its imposition . . .would violate the Eighth
Amendment ... for its imposition would then be the pointless and needless
extinction of life ....
It is ... my judgment that this point has been reached with respect to capital
punishment as it is presently administered .... [Tihe penalty is so infrequently
imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to
criminal justice.
Id. at 312-13 (White, J., concurring).
51. See authority cited supra note 45.
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word "discrimination. ' 52 Justice Stewart's notion of arbitrariness (or, better
perhaps, "caprice") involves selection on the basis of no identifiable trait. It
conjures up visions of a procedural due process violation, a selection
procedure gone haywire, as manifested by its incoherent results. Justice
White's definition of arbitrariness speaks instead in substantive due process
tones. For him, arbitrariness means the failure of a rights-withdrawing
mechanism to achieve enough of a social benefit to justify the illiberal step.
Nor did the three Justices agree on a single solution to the contradictory
problems they identified. Although Justice Stewart wanted some principle
of selection to operate where none was operating before, and Justice
Douglas wanted a selection principle different from the illegitimate one he
saw operating, it was not clear that either agreed with Justice White that
many more selections-more defendants sentenced to die-were the
answer. This is especially clear in Justice Stewart's case, given his view
that, even among first-degree murderers, only a small subset comprised of
the very worst cases warranted society's ultimate punishment. 53
52. Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
53. Complicating matters was McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), in which
the Court, only fourteen months prior to Furman, had refused to read the Due Process
Clause to require reforms that might satisfy Justices William 0. Douglas, Potter Stewart, and
Byron White. As Justice Stewart later would conclude in Furman, the McGautha petitioners
claimed that "state and federal legislatures which provide for [unguided] jury discretion in
capital sentencing ... not only failed to provide a rational basis for distinguishing the one
group from the other, .... but they have failed even to suggest any basis at all." Id. at 203-04
(citation omitted). As Justice White later would do in Furman, the McGautha petitioners
decried the penalty's "rar[ity]"--its imposition "on far fewer than half the defendants found
guilty of capital crimes." Id. at 203. But in a five-person majority opinion that both Stewart
and White joined, the Court rejected the procedural solutions the petitioners proposed:
standards to govern decisions between life and death and bifurcated guilt-innocence and
capital-sentencing hearings to permit evidence inadmissible or prejudicial on the former
issue to be admitted on the latter issue. Rather, expressing faith in "jurors confronted with
the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human," and expressing no
faith in legislators and judges acting in advance of that fateful moment, the Court concluded
that guidance was not constitutionally required: "The infinite variety of cases and facets to
each case would make general standards either meaningless 'boiler-plate' or a statement of
the obvious that no jury would need." Id. at 208. With regard to bifurcation, the Court said
simply that, "[f]rom a constitutional standpoint we cannot conclude that . . . the
compassionate purposes of jury sentencing in capital cases are better served by having the
issues of guilt and punishment determined in a single trial than by focusing the jury's
attention solely on punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined." Id. at 22 1. One
explanation for the seemingly contradictory positions Justices Stewart and White joined in
McGautha and expressed in their opinions in Furman is that the former was a Fourteenth
Amendment due process view and the latter were Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual
punishment views. But as is noted above, the views that both Justices Stewart and White
expressed in Furman draw on different types of due process analyses of just the sort they
had rejected in McGautha. See supra text following note 52; see also Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349, 363-64 (1977) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (acknowledging that, as
the plurality held, "the Due Process Clause ... [is] the vehicle by which the strictures of the
Eighth Amendment [were] triggered" in Furman and other cases "involv[ing] the procedure




IIl. NARROWING VERSUS NUMEROUSNESS IN THE YEARS SINCE FURMAN
A. Delimiting the Capital Circle by Categories of Crime
By the time the Court decided its next five death penalty cases in 1976, a
landslide of three-fourths of the states had opted to reinstate the death
penalty. With Justice Stevens having replaced Justice Douglas, the Court in
Gregg v. Georgia54 answered the big question Furman left unresolved.
Over dissents by Justices Brennan and Marshall, the Court held that "when
a life has been taken deliberately by the offender, we cannot say that the
punishment is invariably disproportionate to the crime."' 55  Before
considering the Court's treatment in Gregg and its companion cases of how
and when deliberate murder could be punished with death-an issue on
which the Furman plurality Justices diverged-we begin with the Court's
answer to a boundary question Gregg left open. May a state capitally
punish crimes other than deliberate killing? 56 On this question-i.e., in
drawing the constitutionally permissible circumference of the capital
circle-the views of Justices Stewart, Stevens, and White converged to
limit significantly the application of the death penalty.
Soon after Gregg, the Court held the death penalty unconstitutional for
the crime of rape57 and indicated that the same rule applied to other non-
homicidal crimes of violence such as armed robbery and kidnapping. 58
Later, the Court held that only those felony murders in which the offender
took life or, at least, intended or contemplated the taking of life could fall
within the circle of constitutionally death-eligible offenses. 59 Justice White
54. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
55. Id. at 187 (footnote omitted).
56. See id. at 187 n.35 (expressly reserving this question).
57. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). The Court limited its ruling to the
imposition of the death penalty for the "rape of an adult woman." Id.; see also id. at 595.
Nothing in the Court's subsequent case law has turned on the qualification. One state,
however, Lousiana, continues to treat the aggravated rape of a victim under age twelve as a
capital crime, see La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:30, 14:42 (2004), and has sentenced a defendant
to die for that crime. See Adam Liptak, Louisiana Sentence Renews Debate on the Death
Penalty, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 2003, at A20 (discussing Patrick 0. Kennedy's death
sentence for raping an eight-year-old girl, and legal challenges to the sentence that are
currently pending).
58. An order vacating death sentences for kidnapping and armed robbery and remanding
for reconsideration in light of Coker, Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977), prompted
the Georgia Supreme Court to rule the death penalty unconstitutional for those offenses as
well. See Garmon v. Johnson, 257 S.E.2d 276, 277 (Ga. 1979) (noting that the death penalty
may not be imposed for armed robbery); Potts v. Georgia, 243 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. 1978)
(invalidating a death sentence for armed robbery); Collins v. Georgia, 236 S.E.2d 759 (Ga.
1977) (holding that the death penalty may not be imposed for the crimes of rape, kidnapping,
and armed robbery).
59. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) ("Putting Enmund to death to avenge
two killings that he did not commit and had no intention of committing or causing does not
measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his just
deserts."). In Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), the Court refined the Enmund standard,
allowing the death eligible circle to include non-intentional first-degree felony murders in
which the offender, although not himself the killer, was a "major participa[nt] in the felony
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wrote for the Court and emphasized the infrequency concerns that drove his
opinion in Furman-the abandonment by most jurisdictions in the nation
and the world of the death penalty for non-homicidal felonies and felonies
in which someone accidentally died at the hands of a co-felon,60 and most
juries' rejection of death for those offenses even in the few states that made
them potentially capital. 6'
Justices Stewart (in the rape case, before leaving the bench) and Stevens
joined Justice White, no doubt because only whim could explain how
prosecutors and jurors picked out the minuscule number of felonies in
which death was imposed even though a killing did not occur or occurred
but was not contemplated by the co-felon. In Figure 1 terms, by placing
outside the death-eligible circle all the "white" area representing the vast
majority of non-homicidal felons who were spared from execution, while
eliminating the sprinkling of death sentences for non-homicidal felons in
the highly mitigated area near the circumference, the decisions eliminated
aspects of the pre-Furman sentencing patterns to which both Justices White
and Stewart objected. The rape decision also responded to Justice
Douglas's concerns, given that historically only black men convicted of
raping white women were at genuine risk of being condemned. 62
B. The Stewart-Stevens Interlude: Narrowing over Numerousness
Although the three controlling analyses in Furman supported limits on
the death penalty for crimes short of deliberate murder, they gave state
legislators mixed signals about which deliberate killers they could render
eligible for the death penalty. One possibility was to adopt bifurcated and
rule-bound procedures of the sort the Court, only a few years before in
committed" and exhibited "reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging
in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death." Id. at 157-58. Either actual
participation in the fatal actus reus or a highly culpable mens rea as to the homicide-
deliberation, premeditation, intent, or gross recklessness-constitutionally suffices.
60. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 789-94; Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 n.4, 593-96, 596 n.10
("Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United States at the present time that authorizes a
sentence of death when the rape victim is an adult woman, and only two other jurisdictions
provide capital punishment when the victim is a child.").
61. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 794-97; Coker, 433 U.S. at 596-97 ("[I]n the vast majority of
[rape] cases, at least 9 out of 10, juries have not imposed the death sentence.").
62. See Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 Yale L.J. 908, 912 (1982)
("Between 1930 and the present, of the 455 persons executed for rape, 405 were black and
two were members of other minorities. Almost ninety percent of those executed were black
men convicted for the rape of white women."); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
449 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing "substantial statistical evidence ... tending to
show a pronounced disproportion in the number of Negroes receiving death sentences for
rape... in the South"). Because the felony murder doctrine often is used in interracial and
inter-class crimes, see Walter L. Gordon, III, Crime and Criminal Law: The California
Experience, 1960-1975, at 13-14, 52-53 (1981); Richard A. Rosen, Felony Murder and the
Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of Death, 31 B.C. L. Rev. 1103, 1117-20 (1990) (noting
that "[c]hanging the rules for murder liability simply because of the presence of a concurrent
felony also has clear racial implication in modern American society" (citing studies)),
Enmund also responded to Douglas's concerns in Furman.
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McGautha v. California,63 had refused to mandate as a matter of due
process. Most of the reenacting states took this approach, and in Gregg64
and two companion cases decided on July 2, 1976,65 the Court facially
approved that approach. In each case, seven Justices concurred in the
judgment-Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens in a jointly authored
plurality opinion;66 Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist in a separate concurrence; 67 and Justice Blackmun in an
uninformative one-line concurrence. 68 These "guided discretion" statutes
typically required a finding of one statutorily authorized aggravating
circumstance in addition to murder before a death sentence could be
imposed; directed the sentencer (usually a jury)69 to act based on all the
aggravating and mitigating factors and to forgo a verdict of death if
mitigation preponderated; and subjected death sentences to automatic
appellate review for nonarbitrariness and conformity with sentences in
similar cases. 70
In their joint opinion, Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens avidly
endorsed guided discretion as a way to assure that death sentences
congregated towards the aggravated center of the circle of death-eligible
cases and thinned out towards the mitigated circumference. 71 Justice White
was less enthusiastic, fearing that jurors granted any kind of discretion to
vote for life might impose the death penalty "in as discriminatory,
standardless, and rare a manner as it was imposed under the scheme
63. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
64. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
65. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
66. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S at 158 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
Ji.).
67. Id. at 207 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
68. Id. at 227 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
69. The Court eventually held that judges could constitutionally sentence defendants to
die, Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), but that a jury must find the aggravating
circumstance necessary to increase the maximum permissible sentence from a prison term to
death. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639 (1990)). Although Ring leaves intact Spaziano's holding that judges may
constitutionally make the ultimate decision whether to impose death, Ring's requirement of a
jury determination of all factors that make a defendant eligible for the maximum penalty of
death has had the practical effect of encouraging nearly all jurisdictions to give jurors the
entire responsibility for capital sentencing. For additional discussion, see infra note 254.
70. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (plurality opinion).
71.
Left unguided, [pre-Furman] juries imposed the death sentence in a way that could
only be called freakish. The new ... sentencing procedures, by contrast, focus the
jury's attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized
characteristics of the individual defendant. While the jury is permitted to consider
any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, it must find and identify at least one
statutory aggravating factor before it may impose a penalty of death. In this way
the jury's discretion is channeled.... [T]he review function of the [state] Supreme
Court... affords additional assurance that the concerns that prompted our decision
in Furman are not present to any significant degree ....
Id. at 206-07.
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declared invalid in Furman."72  He nonetheless rejected the "naked
assertion" that efforts to avoid those problems by guiding discretion were
"bound to fail," resting most of his hopes on the practical force of the
statutes' requirement of proof of a statutory aggravating circumstance in
addition to murder:
As the types of murders for which the death penalty may be imposed
become more narrowly defined and are limited to those which are
particularly serious or for which the death penalty is peculiarly
appropriate as they are in [the new statutes] . . .by reason of the
aggravating-circumstance requirement, it becomes reasonable to expect
that juries-even given discretion not to impose the death penalty-will
impose the death penalty in a substantial portion of the cases so defined.
If they do, it can no longer be said that the penalty is being imposed
wantonly and freakishly or so infrequently that it loses its usefulness as a
sentencing device. 7 3
More to Justice White's liking were guided discretion statutes that
"required [the sentencer] to impose the death penalty on all first-degree
murderers as to whom the statutory aggravating factors outweigh the
mitigating factors." 74 Those statutes gave him "good reason to anticipate"
that the Furman problem would be avoided, because the penalty would "be
imposed with regularity. '75
A sizeable minority of legislatures looked for alternatives to guided-
discretion statutes, perhaps influenced by Justice Harlan's warning in
McGautha that death-sentencing standards were likely to be "meaningless
'boiler-plate' or a statement of the obvious," 76 or by a worry that sentencing
standards combined with jury discretion would limit the number of death
sentences too much to satisfy Justice White. History supplied an
alternative. Mandatory death sentences for all individuals convicted of
specified felonies had been the norm in England for centuries and in the
United States until the mid-nineteenth century. 77 Departing from the
preceding century's "enlightened introduction of flexibility into the
sentencing process" via discretionary death sentencing, a number of states
after Furman mandated death for all first-degree murderers.7 8
Theoretically, the death-eligible circle in those states would be entirely
72. Id. at 221 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
73. Id. at 222.
74. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260 (1976) (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
75. Id; see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 278-79 (1976) (White, J., concurring in
the judgment).
76. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208 (1971); see id. ("For a court to attempt to
catalog the appropriate factors in this elusive area could inhibit rather than expand the scope
of consideration, for no list of circumstances would ever be really complete.").
77. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289-300 (1976) (plurality opinion);
McGautha, 402 U.S. at 197-201.
78. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 402 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see John W.
Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive Criminal Law: The
Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 Ariz. L. Rev. 143 (1986).
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shaded in, as in Figure 2 below. That, in turn, would put aright all three
disturbing patterns the Furman plurality Justices perceived-
discrimination, caprice, and infrequency-because all similarly situated
offenders would receive the same clear and, in Justice White's view,
penologically defensible penalty.
As perfect a solution to the Furman problems as mandatory death
sentencing seemed to provide, a majority of the Court-composed of a
plurality opinion by Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens and a concurring
opinion by Justices Brennan and Marshall-rejected mandatory capital
sentencing in Woodson v. North Carolina.79 Prominent among their
reasons for doing so was a version of Justice Stewart's complaint about the
effect of pre-Furman discretionary death statutes. The plurality opinion
noted that juries in mandatory death-sentencing regimes "have persistently
refused to convict a significant portion of persons" guilty of first-degree
murder because of the known death-sentencing consequences of doing so. 80
By rejecting mandatory death-sentencing statutes because they "provide[]
no standards to guide the jury in its inevitable exercise of the power" of
selective nullification, the plurality relegated Justice White's numerousness
concern to secondary status and made Justice Stewart's narrowing and
patterning concerns preeminent:
While a mandatory death penalty statute may reasonably be expected to
increase the number of persons sentenced to death, it does not fulfill
Furman's basic requirement by replacing arbitrary and wanton jury
discretion with objective standards to guide, regularize, and make
rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.81
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens were convinced that, via the
process in Figure 3, jurors' unfettered ability to acquit first-degree
murderers eventually would transform the solid Figure 3 into a new version
of the capriciously mottled (if somewhat more densely colored in) Figure
1.82
79. 428 U.S. 280.
80. Id. at 302.
81. Id. at 303; accord Stanislaus Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334-36 (1976)
(plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("The
basic concern of Furman centered on those defendants who were being condemned to death
capriciously and arbitrarily.").
82. The plurality did not answer Justice White's question why jurors who could not be
trusted to follow instructions to convict offenders guilty of the carefully instructed upon
elements of first-degree murder could be trusted to follow the more intricate instructions
demanded by guided discretion statutes. Cf Stanislaus Roberts, 428 U.S. at 345-47 (White,
J., dissenting).
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The Court followed the logic of Woodson in a series of cases overturning
the capital statutes that are rendered in Figure 2 above, and Figures 4, 5,
and 6 below. Woodson overturned a North Carolina statute (Figure 2)
making death mandatory for all traditional first-degree murders, including
Woodson's attenuated accessorial felony murder.83 Then, rejecting the
argument that states could sufficiently discourage jurors from arbitrarily
granting mercy via acquittals by narrowing and making only more
aggravated the murders mandatorily punished by death, the Court in
Stanislaus Roberts v. Louisiana84 and Harry Roberts v. Louisiana85
overturned a statute (Figure 4) that limited capital murder to five confined
categories of intentional homicide, such as killing a police officer in the line
of duty. And in Sumner v. Shuman,86 the Court invalidated a still narrower
statute (Figure 5) mandating death for prisoners who deliberately killed
while then serving a sentence of life imprisonment. In each case, the Court
emphasized the possibility that jury nullification, as depicted in Figures 3
and 6, might end up replicating the pattern that most offended Justice
Stewart in Furman.87
83. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. While intoxicated, Woodson served as lookout for a
robbery resulting in a killing by a confederate. ld at 283-84.
84. 428 U.S. 325.
85. 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (per curiam).
86. 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
87. See id at 84; Stanislaus Roberts, 428 U.S. at 348 (plurality opinion); Woodson, 428U.S. at 293 (plurality opinion).
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Figure 4 Figure 5
Figure 6
The Woodson plurality (Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens) also
objected to mandatory capital sentences on the ground that "the penalty of
death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however
long," creating "a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case."'88
Mandatory death sentencing cannot reliably make that case-specific
determination, the plurality argued, because it "accords no significance to
relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the
circumstances of the particular offense ... [and thus to] the possibility of
compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of
humankind. '89 But why, as Justice White asked, doesn't the jury's verdict
of guilt of a capital crime reliably place defendants sentenced to death
88. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion). In a third objection, the plurality
criticized mandatory death sentences as a throwback to a less-enlightened era and, thus, as
inconsistent with the "evolving standards of decency" that govern cruel and unusual
punishment analysis. Id. at 288-301.
89. Id. at 304.
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inside the capital circle (even if nullification spares some others who belong
inside the circle)? 90 Answering this question requires a closer look at
Justice Stewart's and the Woodson plurality's view of the problem in
Furman.
For Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, the Furman problem was not
just the absence of any pattern of death-sentencing dots within the capital
circle but the absence of a particular pattern-a concentration of death
verdicts towards the circle's aggravated center and a thinning out towards
the mitigated circumference. Although the statute overturned in the
Roberts cases and the one overturned in Shuman (see Figures 3-5 above)
might be thought to achieve that pattern, even with a significant amount of
nullification-induced mottling, that assumption ignores the role of
mitigating factors as neutralizers of aggravating factors. For the Woodson
plurality, the same reasoning that treats the aggravated nature of the offense
as drawing the offender towards the aggravated center of the circle also
must treat the extenuating aspects of the offense as propelling the offender
away from the core and towards the mitigated circumference. 91 Just as
nullification arbitrarily relieves some offenders of a death sentence though
their crimes and characters place them at the aggravated core, the absence
of any role for mitigation leads to death sentences for offenders whose
crimes put them at the aggravated core but whose character and "diverse
frailties" pull them back towards the circumference. Once consideration is
given to the explosive effect of nullification and of mitigation's impact on
culpability, the end result of mandatory death sentencing may be more like
that portrayed in Figure 7 than in Figures 2, 4, or 5 and thus hardly different
from the pre-Furman picture in Figure 1.
90. See Stanislaus Roberts, 428 U.S. at 358 (White, J., dissenting) ("Implicit in the
plurality's holding that a separate proceeding must be held at which the sentencer may
consider the character and record of the accused is the proposition that States are
constitutionally prohibited from considering any crime, no matter how defined, so serious
that every person who commits it should be put to death regardless of extraneous factors
related to his character.").
91.
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and
record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense
excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the
possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse
frailties of humankind. It treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not
as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless,
undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.




The Woodson plurality's insistence on individualization to assure
reliability has generated the Court's longest line of cases overturning capital
statutes and verdicts. In addition to decisions invalidating mandatory
death-sentencing statutes, this line of cases includes the Court's watershed
holding in Lockett v. Ohio92 that States may not limit jurors to a finite set of
mitigating factors. 93 It also includes decisions forbidding States to cramp
consideration of mitigating evidence by making capital sentencing turn on
questions that give no extenuating impact to particular kinds of mitigating
evidence or define mitigating factors as aggravating;94 disapproving legal
interpretations of mitigating factors that screen out some of their mitigating
potential; 95 overturning evidentiary rulings that kept mitigating evidence
from the sentencer; 96 rejecting temporal limitations on the periods of the
offender's life that may be considered in mitigation;97 and requiring states
to let individual jurors give weight to factors they believe are mitigating,
even though other jurors do not believe the factor is mitigating or even
present.98
Justice White's different perception of the problem in Furman prompted
a bitter dissent in Woodson. The problem with pre-Furman discretionary
sentencing, he reiterated, was that death "came to be imposed less and less
frequently" until it was inflicted "so seldom and so freakishly and
92. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
93. Id. at 608; see, e.g., Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987); Bell v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 642-43 (1978).
94. See, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 48-49 (2004); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S.
782, 797 (2001); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
95. See, e.g., Smith, 543 U.S. at 47; Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 288-89 (2004);
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982).
96. See, e.g., Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (per curiam).
97. See, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
98. See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 444 (1990); Mills v. Maryland, 486
U.S. 367, 384 (1988).
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arbitrarily that it was no longer serving the legitimate ends of criminal
justice." 99 Nullification notwithstanding, Justice White argued, mandatory
death sentencing would improve matters because jurors would not "refuse
to follow their instructions" to convict murderers of murder as "often and
systematically" as they had refused to impose death when left entirely to
their own devices "under [pre-Furman] statutes." 100
If Justice White found the Woodson plurality's worries about arbitrary
nullification overly persnickety, he found its requirement that jurors
consider all mitigating factors positively pernicious-an "about-face since
Furman."10 1 The reason is not hard to see. When Justice White looked at
the procedures demanded by the Woodson-Roberts-Lockett line of cases, he
saw jurors not only allowed but required to cast large numbers of
potentially condemnable capital murderers out of the death chamber based
on any mitigating factor any juror intuited in the case. He saw Figure 3
magnified, verging quickly back to Figure 1, his pre-Furman bete blanc:
I greatly fear that the effect of the Court's decision today will be to
compel constitutionally a restoration of the state of affairs at the time
Furman was decided, where the death penalty is imposed so erratically
and the threat of execution is so attenuated for even the most atrocious
murders that "its imposition would then be the pointless and needless
extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible
social and public purpose."' 10 2
As these decisions reveal, Justice Stewart's view in Furman triumphed,
and Justice White's receded into dissent throughout the late 1970s and early
1980s. The apogee of Justice Stewart's influence and the perigee of Justice
White's patience came in the 1980 decision in Godfrey v. Georgia.10 3 A
jury had premised Robert Godfrey's death sentence for killing his wife and
mother-in-law on a single aggravating factor-that the killings were
"'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that [they]
involved.., depravity of mind.' ' 104 In overturning the application of this
factor, Justice Stewart's plurality opinion (joined by Justices Blackmun,
Powell, and Stevens, with Justices Brennan and Marshall concurring in the
judgment) suggested that the Court was now prepared to invalidate a death
sentence on the ground that the mix of aggravating and mitigating factors
placed the case unconstitutionally close to the periphery of the death-
eligible circle:
[T]he validity of the petitioner's death sentences turns on whether, in light
of the facts and circumstances of the murders that [Godfrey] was
99. Stanislaus Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 345 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 347-48.
101. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 622 (1978) (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part, and concurring in the judgment).
102. Id. at 623 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J.,
concurring)); see also Stanislaus Roberts, 428 U.S. at 358 (White, J., dissenting).
103. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
104. Id. at 422 (citation omitted).
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convicted of committing, the Georgia Supreme Court can be said to have
applied a constitutional construction of the ["outrageously vile"
circumstance] . . . . We conclude that the answer must be no. The
petitioner's crimes cannot be said to have reflected a consciousness
materially more "depraved" than that of any person guilty of murder. His
victims were killed instantaneously. They were members of his family
who were causing him extreme emotional trauma. Shortly after the
killings, he acknowledged his responsibility ....
There [thus] is no principled way to distinguish this case, in which the
death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not.
10 5
Justice White dissented in the most emotive of his numerous opinions in
post-Furman death penalty cases. To begin with, he was offended by the
peripheral location within the death-eligible circle that the Court assigned to
the case. 10 6 As Justice White's opinion graphically illustrates, sparing none
of the grisly details, he placed Godfrey's double killings at the aggravated
core. 10 7 More basically, Justice White objected to the "role" the plurality
assumed in the case-"peer[ing] majestically over the lower court's
shoulder so that we might second-guess its interpretation of facts that quite
reasonably-perhaps even quite plainly-fit within the statutory language"
of aggravation; and acting as "a finely tuned calibrator of depravity,
demarcating for a watching world the various gradations of dementia that
lead men and women to kill their neighbors." 10 8 In Justice White's view,
"[t]he Georgia Supreme Court, faced with a seemingly endless train of
macabre scenes, ha[d] endeavored in a responsible, rational, and consistent
fashion to effectuate its statutory mandate as illuminated by our judgment
in Gregg," in the process reversing more than a quarter of the post-Furman
death verdicts it reviewed. 10 9 To have the Supreme Court nonetheless
inform Georgia officials that their death-sentencing "efforts have been
outside the Constitution"--throwing more death-sentencing dots out of the
capital circle and leaving more white space within (as in Figure 3, verging
on Figure 1)-was more than Justice White could bear.10
105. Id. at 432-33.
106. Id. at 449-50 (White, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 444-45, 449, 450 & n.2, 451.
108. Id. at 450, 456 n.6.
109. Id. at 456; see also id. at 452-53.
110. Id. at 456. Although Godfrey was the high watermark in the Court's adoption of
Stewart's less-is-better approach, two other decisions came close, again provoking strong
dissents by Justice White. Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991) (intimating, in an opinion
by Justice O'Connor, with Justice Stevens joining and Justice White in vehement dissent,
that the mitigating evidence in the case required a verdict less than death); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (suggesting that the mitigating evidence required a verdict
less than death, with Justice Powell writing for the Court, Justices Stevens and O'Connor
concurring separately, and Justice White joining Chief Justice Burger's harsh dissent).
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C. Justice White Triumphant: Numerousness over Narrowing
Justice White's time came soon enough, however. When Justice Stewart
left the Court soon after Godfrey, Justice Stevens quickly assumed the less-
is-better mantle. With Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, O'Connor, and,
especially later in the period, Justice Blackmun as his frequent allies in this
respect, Justice Stevens succeeded in preserving the less-is-better victories
of the late 1970s and early 1980s, particularly the Woodson-Lockett
endorsement of muscular mitigation."I' Justice Stevens also led the way in
disapproving devices states developed to pry death sentences out of
reluctant jurors in close cases by telling them that, notwithstanding their
sentencing verdict, other authorities would have the final say over whether
the defendant lived or died. 112 But as most other new issues arose, the
advantage swung decisively in Justice White's favor.
111. See, e.g., McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990) (discussed supra note 98
and accompanying text); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 315-16 (1989) (discussed supra
note 94 and accompanying text); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988) (discussed
supra note 98 and accompanying text); other decisions cited supra notes 92-98.
112. In concurring with "misgivings" in the Court's decision to deny a stay of execution
in Maggio v. Williams, Justice Stevens sharply criticized a prosecutor whose closing
argument "sought to minimize the jury's responsibility for imposing a death sentence by
implying that the verdict was merely a threshold determination that would be corrected by
the appellate courts if it were not the proper sentence," thereby "encourag[ing] the jury to err
on the side of imposing the death sentence." 464 U.S. 46, 52-54 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment). In Caldwell v. Mississippi, citing Justice Stevens's opinion in
Maggio, a majority of the Court held that jury instructions and prosecutors' arguments along
these lines are unconstitutional. 472 U.S. 320, 331-32 (1985). Justice Rehnquist dissented,
joined by Justice White. Id. at 343 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Court has not always
strictly adhered to this principle. For example, in California v. Ramos, the Court approved
instructions telling jurors that, though the alternative to a death sentence was life in prison
without possibility of parole, the governor could commute life sentences to life with parole.
463 U.S. 992, 1013 (1983). The Court reached this conclusion despite its acknowledgement
that the instruction might skew jury deliberations in favor of death, see id. at 1016, and over
Justice Stevens's dissenting view that "it is fundamentally wrong for the presiding judge at
the trial-who should personify the evenhanded administration of justice-to tell the jury,
indirectly to be sure, that doubt concerning the proper penalty should be resolved in favor of
[a death sentence]," id. at 1030 (Steven, J., dissenting); see also Romano v. Oklahoma, 512
U.S. 1, 13-14 (1994) (holding, over a dissent joined by Justice Stevens, that a capital-
sentencing jury could permissibly be told that the defendant had already been sentenced to
die in another case). Also of note is Justice Stevens's decision for the Court in Beck v.
Alabama, holding that states may not encourage jurors to locate cases that probably lie
outside the capital circle inside the circle by forbidding judges to instruct jurors on lesser
included offenses of capital murder. 447 U.S. 625 (1980). When life is at stake, Justice
Stevens held for the Court, the Constitution will not tolerate the potentially unreliable effect
of giving jurors a Hobson's choice: either acquit and turn loose defendants who may well be
guilty of a very serious but not a capital offense such as second-degree murder or, to avoid
that unpalatable outcome, convict them of death-eligible first-degree murder. See id. at 644-
46. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Stevens rejected Alabama's more-is-better argument
that its procedure avoided jury nullification of the death penalty and the infrequency
concerns that motivated Justice White in Furman. See id. at 643-45. Justice White joined




Justice Stevens wasted little time in identifying the next step he believed
was necessary to extend and consolidate the less-is-better approach. Using
a medium he was developing into a fine art-an opinion respecting the
denial of certiorari-Justice Stevens argued that a death sentence might
violate the Constitution even though the sentencing jury had made the two
findings that the Court's existing jurisprudence seemed to suggest were
constitutionally sufficient: that at least one statutory aggravating factor was
present, and that the aggravation outweighed mitigation. 113  Only an
additional finding, Justice Stevens argued--"that a comparison of the
totality of aggravating factors with the totality of mitigating factors leaves"
the jury with no reasonable "doubt as to the proper penalty"-would satisfy
Woodson's demand for "reliability in the determination that 'death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case."' 114 In other words, death could
not be imposed unless there was enough aggravation net of mitigation to
"'persuad[e the sentencer], beyond a reasonable doubt, that the imposition
of the death penalty is justified.""'1 5  In the terms introduced by our
diagrams, Justice Stevens was arguing that death could not be imposed
unless, considering both aggravation and mitigation, the offense was
located (as in Figures 8 and 9 below, but not Figure 7 above) inside the
death-eligible circle at a point substantially distant from the mitigated
periphery and near or at the aggravated core.
Figure 8 Figure 9
113. Smith v. North Carolina, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982) (opinion by Stevens, J., respecting
the denial of certiorari).
114. Id. at 1057 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 601 (plurality opinion) (quoting Woodson,
428 U.S. at 305 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.))); see also Maxwell v.
Pennsylvania, 469 U.S. 971, 972 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(arguing that the potential problem Justice Stevens identified in Smith v. North Carolina,
supra, in regard to the North Carolina statute was also present in the Maryland and
Pennsylvania statutes).
115. Smith, 459 U.S. at 1057 (quoting State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83 (Utah 1982)).
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Instead of leading the Court's next advance towards a full-fledged less-
is-better conception of constitutional capital sentencing, however, Justice
Stevens spent most of the next decade and a half dissenting from the
Court's retreat from that conception. In thirteen decisions between 1983
and 1993 (the year Justice White retired), and in three decisions thereafter
(the latest in 2000), the Court dramatically reversed field. With Justice
White writing five and concurring in all the majority opinions while he was
on the bench, the Court veered sharply in the more-is-better direction he
had surveyed in Furman.116
1. Aggravation
Recall that Justice White pinned his numerousness hopes for guided
discretion statutes on the power of aggravating circumstances to motivate
jurors to impose death."17 The aggravating circumstance requirement
pursued this goal by narrowing the range of death-eligible offenses to ones
likely to strike jurors as warranting death and by directing jurors' attention
to aspects of the case calling for death. Justice White thus hoped to crowd
the death-sentence dots in Figure 7 inside the smaller death-eligible space
representing aggravated capital murder, as in Figure 8 above. He hoped
that doing this would achieve a high enough concentration of death verdicts
to make a penologically convincing case that such murders deserved, and
their perpetrators would receive, the death penalty. Unlike Justice
Stevens's route to Figure 8, however, which proceeded by telling jurors
disposed to impose death to think again based on the mix of aggravating
and mitigating factors, Justice White's route to the same outcome told
jurors disposed not to impose death to think again based primarily on the
aggravating factors. In short, Justice White hoped the aggravating
116. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993); Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993);
Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461 (1993); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); Lewis v.
Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990); Boyde v. California,
494 U.S. 370 (1990); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990); Maynard v.
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988); Lowenfield v. Phelp, 484 U.S. 231 (1988); McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984); Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862 (1983). Three decisions rendered after Justice White left the Court deserve equal
status in reflecting and completing the Court's turnaround. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S.
225 (2000); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504
(1995). In the sixteen cases total, Justice, later Chief Justice, Rehnquist-who had joined all
of Justice White's separate opinions in the July 2, 1976 cases-wrote six of the majority
decisions. (Between them, Justice White and Justice, later Chief Justice, Rehnquist wrote
eleven of the sixteen majority decisions.) Justice Stevens's growing disaffection with the
Court's direction is illustrated by his votes: He wrote the earliest of the sixteen majority
decisions in these cases (Zant v. Stephens); concurred in the judgment on the facts of the
next case (Pulley v. Harris) while taking issue with the logic and most of the impact of the
majority opinion; dissented in thirteen of the remaining fourteen cases (all but Maynard v.
Cartwright, discussed infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text); and wrote the dissenting
opinion in six of those thirteen cases (McCleskey v. Kemp, Walton v. Arizona, Payne v.
Tennessee, Graham v. Collins, Harris v. Alabama, and Weeks v. Angelone).
117. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
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circumstances feature of modem guided discretion statutes would
"jawbone" jurors into sentencing capital murderers to death by keeping
prominently before their eyes the especially egregious aspects of the crime
and criminal. 11 8
In its 1980s and 1990s cases, the Court made this aspect of Justice
White's analysis the law of the land. In doing so, the Court reinterpreted
Godfrey as holding not that reviewing courts could white-out death
sentences jurors had inscribed too close to the periphery of the death-
eligible circle but rather that legislators could satisfy Furman's narrowing
requirement by etching a death-warranted inner circle somewhere inside the
death-eligible circle and by encouraging jurors to black-in as many death
sentences as possible within the inner circle.
In Zant v. Stephens, the Court held that, if at least one statutory
aggravating factor was present-if the legislature had drawn the inner circle
and the jury tentatively had placed the case within it-the jury was free to
consider other non-statutory aggravating factors in deciding whether to
impose death. 119 Because Zant let state legislators cede control over
aggravating factors to individual sentencers as long as at least one
legislatively identified factor was available to accomplish the
constitutionally required narrowing, many observers see Zant as marking
the collapse of the Stewart anti-caprice line of thinking and the ascendance
of a more forgiving interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. 120 In fact, the
case fits neatly within the Stewart-Stevens line of thinking--explaining
why Justice Stevens wrote the decision. Zant gave jurors the same leeway
to locate cases towards the center of the circle based upon their individual
assessments of aggravation as Woodson, Lockett, and other Stewart-
influenced decisions had given jurors to locate cases away from the center,
and even outside the circle, based on mitigation.121 Unlike Woodson and
118. Cf Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on
Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 355,
373-75 (1995) (describing this aspect of the aggravating circumstance requirement an
inadvertent failure, not as the outcome Justice White sought).
119. Zant, 462 U.S. at 890-91.
120. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 45, at 1076-77; Weisberg, supra note 8, at 305, 315,
317; see also Ursula Bentele, The Death Penalty in Georgia: Still Arbitrary, 62 Wash. U.
L.Q. 573 (1985); Brent E. Newton, A Case Study in Sentencing Unfairness: The Texas
Death Penalty, 1973-1994, 1 Tex. F. on C.L. & C.R. 1 (1993); The Death of Fairness?
Counsel Competency and Due Process in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Hous. L. Rev. 1105
(1994). By allowing consideration of aggravating circumstances about which the statute was
silent, Zant certainly did reveal, in contradistinction to what many observers initially
thought, that the "guidance" provided by so-called "guided discretion statutes" would come
more from the logic of the concept of aggravation (in Justice White's view) or of
aggravation net of mitigation (in the view championed by Justices Stewart and Stevens) than
from instructions actually set forth in the statute and conveyed to the jury.
121. As the Court stated in Zant,
Our cases indicate . . . that statutory aggravating circumstances play a
constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative definition: they
circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. But the
Constitution does not require the jury to ignore other possible aggravating factors
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Lockett, however, Zant prompted no dissent from Justice White and his
disciples. In contrast to the power to grant mercy based on non-statutorily
specified mitigating factors as depicted in Figure 6, the discretion to impose
death based on legally unstated aggravating factors only allayed White's
infrequency fears.
Zant is important for another reason as well. Typically, difficulties with
the Court's death penalty doctrine are ascribed to an allegedly untenable
mixture of doctrines heeding Furman's call for guidance and rules and
Woodson/Lockett's call for individualization and discretion. This classic
criticism associates "discretion" with the Court's holdings in Woodson and
Lockett-decisions we place in the Stewart-Stevens camp-and associates
"rules" with holdings supported by Justice White and his allies. 122 In fact,
both of the contending sides in the Court's post-Furman debates advocated
combinations of rules and discretion. 123 As Zant revealed, the Stewart-
in the process of selecting, from among that class, those defendants who will
actually be sentenced to death. What is important at the selection stage is an
individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the
circumstances of the crime.
Zant, 462 U.S. at 878-79 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1982);
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 601-05 (1978) (plurality opinion); Harry Roberts v.
Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636-37 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
303-04 (1976) (plurality opinion)); see also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 958 (1983)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (applying a similar analysis in concurring with the majority opinion
upholding a death sentence premised on a somewhat more idiosyncratic set of nonstatutory
aggravating factors). Justice Stevens further explained the logic of Zant in a concurring
opinion in Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 981 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment), and in a dissenting opinion in Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 500 (1993)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens approved of the state's use of capital-sentencing
factors, such as the "age of the victim," even though they concededly apply in every case
and even though the jury is not instructed as to how the factors are relevant and whether they
are aggravating or mitigating. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 981-83, 987. He reasoned that, because
the factors are relevant to individualized sentencing, a jury informed of them would be more
likely to base its decision on a reliable judgment about the relative amounts of aggravation
and mitigation and less likely to rely on race or other arbitrary considerations. Id.
122. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 279 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(alleging an "incompatibility between the Lockett-Eddings requirement [of unfettered
consideration of mitigating circumstances] and the holding of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972) (per curiam), that the sentencer's discretion must be constrained to avoid
arbitrary or freakish imposition of the death penalty"); Graham, 506 U.S. at 499 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the Furman requirement of guidance cannot be maintained if
Lockett and Eddings are read to mean "that the State has no role in structuring or giving
shape to the jury's consideration of these mitigating factors" (internal quotation omitted));
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) ("To acknowledge that 'there perhaps is an inherent tension' between [the
Woodson-Lockett principle and Furman] is rather like saying that there was perhaps an
inherent tension between the Allies and the Axis Powers in World War II .... They cannot
be reconciled."); Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion
and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1147, 1165-67 (1991)
(discussing the implications of Justice Scalia's abandonment of Woodson and Lockett).




Stevens narrowing approach tolerated considerable discretion as to both
non-statutorily specified aggravation and mitigation (assuming aggravating
factors performed a narrowing function), while Justice White's
numerousness approach likewise tolerated discretion as to aggravation, but
not as to mitigation. Later decisions reveal, moreover, that Justice Stevens
would have placed substantially more limits on the discretion to define and
consider aggravating circumstances than the prevailing White approach.
In Lowenfield v. Phelps, the Court permitted states to satisfy the statutory
aggravating-circumstance requirement at the guilt rather than the sentencing
phase, by adopting more-aggravated-than-usual definitions of murders
subject to capital punishment. 124 States that did so, Lowenfield additionally
held, were then free to let juries base death verdicts not only on non-
statutory aggravating factors, as in Zant, but also on statutory factors that
served no narrowing function because they merely replicated elements of
capital murder that the jury already had found at the guilt phase. 125 The
capacity of these aggravating factors' supernumerary reappearance at the
sentencing phase to "jawbone" jurors into relying on it as a basis for death
no doubt appealed to Justice White's more-is-better instincts. But the
possibility that the factors' double duty would lead jurors to believe more
aggravation was present that in fact was true-to believe that the case was
farther inside the capital circle than it was-prompted Justice Stevens to
dissent. 126
Subsequent decisions on the constitutionality and application of
particular aggravating circumstances-with Justice White leading the way
and Justice Stevens in dissent-further expanded the death-sentencing
discretion that aggravating factors may permissibly grant sentencers. First,
however, came a transitional decision, Maynard v. Cartwright, in which a
unanimous Court speaking through Justice White struck down Oklahoma's
"'especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel"' factor. 127 In the process, Justice
White brilliantly recast the Court's less-is-better classic, Godfrey v.
Georgia, into a more-is-better prop.
Noting that "an ordinary person could honestly believe that every
unjustified, intentional taking of human life is 'especially heinous,"'
Maynard invalidated the heinousness factor because it had no
constitutionally sufficient "narrowing principle."'128 From Justice White's
perspective, a murder's designation as "heinous" had little power to
convince jurors to impose death. From Justice Stevens's perspective, a
murder's heinousness failed to locate it at or near the aggravated core of
first-degree murders, and he joined Justice White's decision.
124. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988).
125. See id.
126. Id. at 247 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.).
127. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363-64 (1988).
128. Id.
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More crucially, the Maynard Court also "rejected the submission that a
particular set of facts surrounding the murder, however shocking they might
be, [is] enough in themselves, and without some narrowing principle to
apply to those facts, to warrant the imposition of the death penalty."'1 29 In
theory, this passage is consistent with the Stewart-Stevens view that jurors
may choose between life and death only in accordance with instructions
explaining the aggravation-net-of-mitigation logic of decision, and Justice
Stevens raised no objection. But as the Court's next "heinousness" case,
Lewis v. Jeffers,130 revealed, Justice White understood the passage to mean
something different. In Lewis, over Justice Stevens's dissent, Justice White
read the language to revoke Godfrey's invitation to reviewing courts to
determine where a particular offense belongs within the death-eligible
circle and whether death constitutionally could be imposed for an offense
located there. 131 Lewis thus enshrined the rule that Justice White had
unsuccessfully advanced in Godfrey: A particular set of facts surrounding a
murder, however moderate and ordinary those facts may be, cannot
invalidate a death verdict that was premised on an aggravating factor that
the statute or court had nominally cabined within a narrowing principle.
Having required state legislatures to use the aggravating circumstance
requirement to narrow death eligibility within the inner circle in Figure 8,
the Court next had to decide how far inside the outer circle the new circle
belonged. The answer given in four cases decided in the early 1990s-two
authored by Justice White, with Justice Stevens dissenting in all four-was
that a paper-thin margin, much smaller than that in Figure 8, would
suffice. 132  Indeed, the decisions made clear that, pace Godfrey, the
misnamed "narrowing" requirement has little to do with achieving a
significant quantity of aggravation, i.e., with establishing the crime's or
criminal's relative distance from the non-aggravated circumference and
proximity to the super-aggravated core. Rather, the "narrowing"
requirement has everything to do with convincing the sentencer of the
crime's or criminal's quality of "being aggravated," i.e., with "jawboning"
as many death verdicts out of juries as possible. 133 True to Justice White's
129. Id. at 363.
130. 497 U.S. 764 (1990).
131. Id. at 776, 779. But see id. at 784 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.).
132. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991)
(overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)) (opinion of the Court by Powell, J.,
joined by, inter alia, Stevens, J.); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990); Lewis v. Jeffers,
497 U.S. 764 (1990). Justice White authored the majority opinions in Walton and Lewis.
133. See supra notes 72-75, 117-18 and accompanying text. In addition to serving a
narrowing function, aggravating factors must be "determinate." Arave, 507 U.S. at 474. By
requiring that a trait be easily recognized as aggravating when it is present, and that its
presence or absence be easily detectable, the determinacy requirement helps assure that
aggravating circumstances will draw jurors' attention to aspects of the offense or offender
beyond the elements of capital murder that call for a death sentence. See Espinosa v. Florida,
505 U.S. 1079, 1081 (1992) (per curiam) (holding that standards must provide "guidance for
determining the presence or absence of the factor[s]"); Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 224
(1992) (rejecting "factors which as a practical matter fail to guide").
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approach, aggravation had everything to do with broadening sentencers'
discretion to impose death, and nothing to do with the rules Justices Stewart
and Stevens sought to steer death-sentencing discretion towards the core of
the capital-eligible circle.
The aggravating factors the Court upheld were indeed broad. For
example, even in cases where premeditation and deliberation defined first-
degree murder, and thus the size and location of the circumference of the
outer, capital circle, the Court held that states could sufficiently "narrow"
death-eligible murders to a point inside the outer circle by treating as
"aggravating" any first-degree murder that, additionally, was "coldblooded,
pitiless" 134  or was committed "without feeling or sympathy" or
"indifferen[tly] to the suffering of the victim." 135  In other words, an
aggravating factor that encompasses the vast majority of capital murders
suffices, as long as "not all" such murders are included.1 36
Going further in two decisions written by Justice White, the Court
permitted Arizona to define its heinousness factor as any fact about the
crime or criminal that places the case "above the norm of first-degree
murders."'137 Enough narrowing occurs, the Court held, if the sentencer, in
its discretion, can find any fact in the case that to any degree advances the
case past the circumference and into the center of the capital circle. In this
way, the Court permitted states to use lists of aggravating circumstances
that, taken as a whole, encompass all capital crimes--even those on the
circumference-as long as no single circumstance was itself entirely
encompassing. In the Arizona cases, for example, the Court approved the
subdivision of that state's "above the norm" gloss on heinousness into (by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's count) thirty
subcategories of aggravation, including several paired possibilities that,
between them, capture all possible cases-e.g., that the victim had time to
contemplate her impending death or, instead, was caught unawares and
lacked time to prepare to die.1 38
134. Arave, 507 U.S. at 468.
135. Id. at 481, 488; Walton, 497 U.S. at 655; see also Lewis, 497 U.S. at 775; cf State v.
Charboneau, 774 P.2d 299, 342 (Idaho 1989) (Bistline, J., dissenting) ("What first degree
murderer fails to show 'callous disregard for human life'? I suppose this would be the
'pitiful' slayer who, prior to delivering the fatal blow, tells the victim: 'Excuse me, pardon
me, I know it's inconvenient, but I must now take your life."').
136. See Arave, 507 U.S. at 475-76. The Court concluded that although a "sentencing
judge might conclude that every first-degree murderer is 'pitiless,"' and although factors
such as "cold-blooded" describe a wide variety of murders, the circumstance is
constitutional because "not all ... capital defendants are 'cold-blooded,"' i.e., "without
feeling or sympathy," given that "some within the broad class of first-degree murderers do
exhibit feeling." Id.
137. See Lewis, 497 U.S. at 784 (approving the standard in State v. Gretzler, 659 P.2d 1,
9-11 (Ariz. 1983)).
138. See Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 497
U.S. 1031 (1990); see also Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 977, 979 (1994) (approving
sentencing factors, e.g., "age of the victim," that admittedly are difficult for jurors to use
because they apply, albeit with more or less force, in every case); Arave, 507 U.S. at 476
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Similarly, the Court allowed jurors to weigh "victim impact" aggravating
factors in the sentencing balance, even when those factors encompass
effects of a crime on the victim's family and friends that the defendant had
no way of anticipating. 139  Overall, therefore, aggravating factors are
judged by their capacity to convey some potentially death-inviting quality
of evil-their potential to jawbone a sentencer into imposing death-
regardless of whether they are quantitatively limited to less than all capital
murders and murderers. The breadth that was the aggravators' chief vice
from the less-is-better perspective of Justices Stewart and Stevens was their
main virtue from Justice White's and, in time, the Court's more-is-better
point of view.
These cases completed the Court's retreat from Godfrey's quantitative or
"core-ward" definition of aggravating circumstances and from its fact-
sensitive method of reviewing such circumstances. Maynard began the
retreat by focusing single-mindedly on the propriety of the state's verbal
formulation of the factor and by refusing to consider the facts of the case. 140
Lewis greatly limited the situations in which reviewing courts could
overturn a sentencer's conclusion that the facts satisfied the circumstance's
"narrowing" formulation. 141 And Arave v. Creech refused to consider the
facts of other cases in which the circumstance had (or had not) been found,
even where doing so might shed light on whether in fact the factor has any
narrowing effect. 142 Aggravating factors suffice if they create a realistic
possibility of wrangling death sentences out of otherwise reluctant
sentencers, no matter how consistently they actually do so and no matter
whether they place the case at any distance from the capital circle's non-
aggravated periphery.
(approving aggravating circumstances inviting death sentences because the killing was
committed vengefully with feeling (deriving "pleasure") and callously "without feeling").
139. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 814-15 (1991). Unlike the other aggravating
circumstances discussed in this section, the victim impact in Payne was not a statutory
aggravating circumstance designed to "narrow" the class of death-eligible murders, but a
non-statutory aggravating factor that Tennessee allowed jurors to weigh in the ultimate
sentencing balance. Still, Justice Stevens found the factor objectionable because it invited
jurors to treat aspects of the case as aggravating though they have little or no capacity to
render the case more aggravated than other murder cases. See id. at 859-64 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). From Justice White's perspective, however, by drawing particularized attention
to what is horrible about every murder, the factor served a usefully persuasive function.
140. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
141. See Lewis, 497 U.S. at 783 (holding that the Constitution is satisfied by the finding
of a properly defined aggravating factor unless "no reasonable sentencer" could conclude
that the facts satisfy the definition).
142. See Arave, 507 U.S. at 477; see also Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 534 (1992)
(declining, over Justice Stevens's dissent, to rule that use of a "heinousness" aggravating
circumstance without any limiting instruction is so obviously and egregiously error under the
Eight Amendment that the trial judge should have provided a narrowing instruction even
absent the defendant's request for one).
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2. Cases Close to the Line
In three cases decided in 1990, the Court explicitly rejected the view
Justice Stevens had advanced in a 1982 opinion respecting the denial of
certiorariI 43-that aggravation must substantially exceed mitigation before
death may be imposed. 144 In the majority's view, it was a matter of no
interest whether the aggravating and mitigating facts left a case only
slightly inside the circle defined by the elements of capital murder--or,
indeed, whether, once the aggravating and mitigating circumstances were
considered, the case remained inside the circle at all. Reflecting Justice
White's preference in the July 2, 1976 cases, 145 and with Justice Stevens in
dissent, the Court held that states could require sentencers to impose death
in any case brought inside the capital circle by the guilt and aggravating-
factor findings unless the offender could prove that mitigation outweighed
aggravation.' 46 Even if mitigation entirely neutralized the more-than-
murder aggravation, propelling the case all the way back to the capital
circle's outer circumference, the state still could require the sentencer to
impose death.
Four years before Furman, the Supreme Court, through Justice Stewart,
with Justice White in dissent, held "that the decision whether a man
deserves to live or die must be made on scales that are not deliberately
tipped toward death." 147 A quarter century later, however, Justice White's
search for numerousness enshrined the opposite principle, favoring a
presumption of death. Lowenfield suggested this presumption by inviting
juries to give double weight to aggravating factors, as did the Court's
decisions allowing states to define aspects of all capital murders as
sufficient to justify a death sentence.1 48 The presumption was explicit in
the sentencing instructions upheld by the 1990 cases, which told jurors that,
"when aggravation and mitigation are equal, you must impose death." The
Court later approved Alabama's distension of the same principle into a two-
143. Smith v. North Carolina, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982) (opinion by Stevens, J., respecting
the denial of certiorari); see supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
144. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 651-52 (1990); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370,
374, 377 (1990); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 302, 306-07 (1990).
145. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260 (1976) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 277 (1976) (White, J., concurring in the judgment);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 306 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); Stanislaus
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 337 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
146. Walton, 497 U.S. at 655-56; Boyde, 494 U.S. at 386; Blystone, 494 U.S. at 308-09.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Kansas invalidated a statutory provision requiring a death
sentence when aggravation and mitigation are in "equipoise." State v. Kleypas, 40 P.3d 139,
223, 234 (Kan. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 834 (2002). The Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari to review that conclusion. Kansas v. Marsh, 125 S. Ct. 2517 (2005)
(mem.).
147. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521 & n.20 (1968) (holding "that a State may
not entrust the determination of whether a man should live or die to a tribunal organized to
return a verdict of death").
148. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
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chances-at-death procedure, which gave trial judges unfettered discretion to
reject life verdicts imposed by jurors and substitute death absent any
indication that the jurors failed to follow the law. 149 Only Justice Stevens
dissented.15 0
Finally, a line of cases in the 1990s (in all of which Justice Stevens
dissented) allowed states to juxtapose lengthy instructions on aggravation
with terse and uninformative references to mitigation, 151 and to give
instructions designed to keep jurors from considering some, as long as the
jurors were not kept from considering all, of the extenuating value of
particular mitigating factors.152 Together with the Court's other holdings,
these decisions validated procedures requiring death sentences in cases in
149. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 512-15 (1995).
150. Id. at 515-16, 526 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens concluded that "the
complete absence of standards to guide the judge's consideration of the jury's verdict
renders the statute invalid under the Eighth Amendment," and that "[t]o permit the State to
execute a woman in spite of the community's considered judgment that she should not die is
to sever the death penalty from its only legitimate mooring." Id. Justice Stevens's powerful
dissent in Harris reveals him characteristically at his best when speaking for only himself
In (modest) defense of the rest of the Court, it should be pointed out that Alabama trial
judges also have the power, for no reason at all, to substitute life verdicts for death sentences
imposed by jurors. It is just-as Justice Stevens pointed out-that elected Alabama judges
never do so, in contrast to their frequent substitution of death for life verdicts. See id. at 520-
21; see also Schiro v. Indiana, 493 U.S. 910, 912 (1989) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari) (questioning Indiana's practice, since abandoned, of permitting judges to override
jury verdicts in capital cases).
151. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 272
n.1 (1998); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 373-74 & n.l (1990). In Weeks, the Court
refused, over Justice Stevens's dissent, to overturn a jury verdict in favor of death
notwithstanding that (1) the jury wrote the trial judge a note expressing confusion about the
terse, ambiguous, and potentially misleading and under-inclusive instructions on mitigation;
(2) in contrast to how little the instructions said about mitigation, they placed considerable
emphasis on aggravation; and (3) the trial judge responded to the jurors' request for more
guidance by merely reprising the instruction that had initially confused them. 528 U.S. at
225. In Buchanan, the Court upheld instructions that made no mention of mitigation or
extenuation at all, and instead said only that "'[i]f you find from the evidence that the
Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the requirements of the preceding
paragraph [discussing aggravating circumstances], then you may fix the punishment of the
Defendant at death or if you believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not
justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the Defendant at life imprisonment."' 522 U.S.
at 272 n.1. In Boyde, the Court upheld an instruction that limited the constitutionally
mandated directive to consider the full range of mitigating aspects of the defendant's
background and character as well as of the offense to a single reference to "'[a]ny other
circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse
for the crime."' 494 U.S. at 373-74 & n.1; see also Brown v. Payton, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1440-
41 (2005) (extending Boyde, over Justice Stevens's dissent, to a case in which the prosecutor
was permitted to argue repeatedly that the jury could treat only aspects of the offense as
mitigating and could not (or, at least, should not) consider the defendant's demonstrable
reformation in prison after the offense); Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1993) (per
curiam) (holding, over Justice Stevens's dissent based on the presumption of innocence, that
defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the mitigating circumstance that he had no
prior criminal history, where neither the state nor the defendant presented any evidence
about the defendant's prior criminal record or lack thereof).




which full attention to mitigation might have revealed that the offenses
were actually outside the capital circle.
3. Categorical Mitigation
As is noted above, Justices White, Stewart, and Stevens joined forces in
the late 1970s and early 1980s to limit the crimes subject to capital
punishment to deliberate or at least grossly and advertently reckless
murder. 153 Justice White favored this baseline because it included only
crimes aggravated enough to jawbone death sentences out of most jurors,
thereby ensuring the numerousness he demanded for a category of murders
to be death eligible. Justices Stewart and Stevens also favored the baseline,
but for a different reason: It excluded crimes that almost never fell at the
aggravated core. But as three decisions issued in 1988 and 1989 revealed,
agreement on a baseline of highly aggravated crimes did not translate into
agreement on a baseline of highly aggravated criminals.
The rift first appeared in Thompson v. Oklahoma 54 in 1988. Justice
Stevens's four-person plurality opinion concluded that executions of
individuals who were under sixteen years old at the time they committed
the crime were so rare (none having occurred in the United States since
1948), and that such offenders were so much less culpable than adults, that
Thompson could not constitutionally be executed for a crime he committed
as a fifteen-year-old. 155 Justice O'Connor concurred separately, concluding
only that it was unconstitutional to execute Thompson under a statute that
was silent as to any age limit on eligibility for the death penalty and thus
did not explicitly contemplate the death penalty for fifteen-year-olds. 156 In
dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice White, saw no reason to doubt the jury's conclusion that Thompson
himself was sufficiently culpable to be sentenced to die, given the nature of
his offense. 157 In essence, Justice Stevens and his allies believed the
153. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
154. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
155. Id. at 838 (plurality opinion).
156.
The case before us today raises some of the same concerns that have led us to
erect barriers to the imposition of capital punishment in other contexts. Oklahoma
has enacted a statute that authorizes capital punishment for murder, without setting
any minimum age at which the commission of murder may lead to the imposition
of that penalty. The State has also, but quite separately, provided that 15-year-old
murder defendants may be treated as adults in some circumstances. Because it
proceeded in this manner, there is a considerable risk that the Oklahoma
Legislature either did not realize that its actions would have the effect of rendering
15-year-old defendants death eligible or did not give the question the serious
consideration that would have been reflected in the explicit choice of some
minimum age for death eligibility.
Id. at 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
157.
[A] jury then considered whether, despite his young age, his maturity and moral
responsibility were sufficiently developed to justify the sentence of death. In
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mitigating force of a fifteen-year-old's youth would inevitably distance any
offense committed from the aggravated core, while Justice White and his
allies saw no reason to immunize fifteen-year-old offenders from death
sentences that the aggravated nature of their crimes persuaded jurors to
impose.
In the two cases decided the next year, however, with Justice Anthony
Kennedy now having joined the Court and with Justice O'Connor having
switched sides, Justice Stevens lost his fragile majority. In Stanford v.
Kentucky, 158 Justice Scalia concluded in a four-person plurality opinion
(joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy, with
Justice O'Connor concurring separately on slightly narrower grounds 159)
that, despite the infrequent imposition of the death penalty on defendants
who committed murder as sixteen or seventeen-year-olds, there was no
constitutional reason to treat them as automatically ineligible for the death
penalty. Although the plurality was comprised of Justices White and other
Justices who opposed unlimited mitigation, they reasoned in this case that
the constitutional assurance of "individualized consideration" of Stanford's
youth and other aspects of the case made it lawful to sentence him to die. 160
Similar logic supported the Court's ruling in Stanford's companion case,
Penry v. Lynaugh,161 that the Constitution does not automatically bar the
death penalty for mentally retarded offenders. In an opinion by Justice
O'Connor, the five-person majority concluded that constitutionally
mandated individualization would enable jurors to distinguish properly
between mentally retarded criminals who should live and those who should
die, making a categorical ban unnecessary. 162 Justice O'Connor's reliance
on the mitigating force of mental retardation was not surprising. Since
replacing Stewart on the Court, Justice O'Connor had generally supported
upsetting this particularized judgment on the basis of a constitutional absolute, the
plurality pronounces it to be a fundamental principle of our society that no one
who is as little as one day short of his 16th birthday can have sufficient maturity
and moral responsibility to be subjected to capital punishment for any crime. As a
sociological and moral conclusion that is implausible; and it is doubly implausible
as an interpretation of the United States Constitution.
Id. at 863-64 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy took no part in the Court's decision in
Thompson.
158. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
159. Id. at 381-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Although Justice O'Connor agreed that no national consensus had developed against
executing defendants for crimes committed when they were sixteen or seventeen, she
disagreed with the plurality's determination that the constitutionality of the death penalty for
a class of offenders is based entirely on the number of state legislatures that permit or forbid
the execution of those offenders. Id. In Justice O'Connor's view, the Court must
additionally exercise its own proportionality judgment. Id.
160. Id. at 375 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., and Kennedy, J.) (quoting
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
161. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
162. "So long as sentencers can consider and give effect to mitigating evidence of mental
retardation in imposing sentence, an individualized determination whether 'death is the
appropriate punishment' can be made in each particular case." Id. at 340.
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the Court's mitigation decisions. 163 But what about the rest of her majority,
comprised entirely of Justices, White included, who opposed unbounded
mitigation? What suddenly made them such avid fans of individualization?
The lineup of Justices on a second issue in Penry provides an answer.
Joined on this issue by Justice Stevens and the other Stanford dissenters,
Justice O'Connor concluded that the jury instructions given in Penry's case
did not in truth allow his mental retardation to be considered in mitigation.
In dissenting from that ruling, Justice White and the rest of the Stanford
plurality found attractive exactly what Justice O'Connor (and Justice
Stevens) found constitutionally offensive about the instructions: They
jawboned jurors into treating Penry's retardation as mainly aggravating
(because he was more likely to offend in the future), thus increasing the
likelihood that the jury would impose death. For Justice White and his
allies, individualization meant the discretion to find attributes of criminals
sufficiently awful to justify death-including that they committed heinous
crimes as children or as a result of a mental disability. For Justice Stevens
and his allies, individualization meant the legal duty to premise outcomes
on all of the mitigating as well as aggravating aspects of youth and mental
disability. Where aggravation threatens to overwhelm the jurors' capacity
to consider mitigation (as Justice Stevens, but not Justice O'Connor
believed was true in the case of juvenile and mentally retarded offenders),
categorical constraints were needed, lest jurors treat cases that were not at
the aggravated core as if they were. 164
4. Death-Sentencing Patterns
Interspersed among the Court's decisions refusing to require capital
sentencing to conform to Justices Stewart's and Stevens's aggravation-net-
163. See, e.g., Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 288 (2004) (O'Connor, J.) ("Reasonable
jurists could conclude that the low IQ evidence Tennard presented was relevant mitigating
evidence. Evidence of significantly impaired intellectual functioning is obviously evidence
that might serve as a basis for a sentence less than death." (internal quotation omitted));
Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) (O'Connor, J.) ("[I]t is only when the jury is
given a vehicle for expressing its reasoned moral response to that evidence in rendering its
sentencing decision, that we can be sure that the jury has treated the defendant as a uniquely
individual human bein[g] and has made a reliable determination that death is the appropriate
sentence." (internal quotations omitted)); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 340 (O'Connor, J.)
("[M]ental retardation is a factor that may well lessen a defendant's culpability for a capital
offense .... So long as sentencers can consider and give effect to mitigating evidence of
mental retardation in imposing sentence, an individualized determination whether 'death is
the appropriate punishment' can be made in each particular case."); Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Because sentences of death are
'qualitatively different' from prison sentences, this Court has gone to extraordinary measures
to ensure that the prisoner sentenced to be executed is afforded process that will guarantee,
as much as is humanly possible, that the sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion,
prejudice, or mistake. Surely, no less can be required when the defendant is a minor."
(footnote and citation omitted)).
164. We are indebted to Professor Elizabeth Emens for this insight. See Elizabeth Emens,




of-mitigation logic are decisions refusing to require courts or officials to
attend to sentencing patterns at all. We already mentioned Arave v. Creech,
which refused to examine the pattern of all of a state's decisions applying a
particular aggravating factor. 165 Even more to the point are Pulley v.
Harris166 and McCleskey v. Kemp. 167 Respectively, those decisions held
that federal courts have no business scrutinizing, or requiring state courts to
scrutinize, sentencing patterns to assure via "comparative proportionality
review" that other offenders in the immediate vicinity within the capital
circle of the case under review also received the death penalty, 168 or via
"arbitrariness review" that true aggravation and mitigation, not illegitimate
considerations such as the victim's race, account for the run of sentences
imposed.169 In all of these cases, the Court concluded that adherence to
other Eighth Amendment doctrines, particularly the requirement of a
statutory aggravating circumstance, suffices constitutionally no matter
where any particular case falls within the capital circle and no matter what
sentence is typically imposed in similar cases.
In the face of Justice Stevens's powerful dissent, the Court's decision in
McCleskey reveals how deeply committed the Court had become to the
more-is-better approach to capital sentencing. The Court upheld
McCleskey's death sentence for shooting a white police officer despite
proof that the murder of a white victim in Georgia was 4.3 times more
likely to provoke a death sentence than the otherwise identical murder of a
black victim. 170 Justice Powell's decision for the Court proceeded in six
steps: (1) As interpreted in Furman, the Eighth Amendment cannot tolerate
the irrational death verdicts generated by wholly discretionary death
sentencing; (2) the July 2, 1976 cases constrained death sentencing so that,
while some jury discretion remains, it is controlled by "objective standards"
designed to achieve "nondiscriminatory application"; (3) in rejecting
mandatory death sentences, the July 2, 1976 cases held that some amount of
165. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
166. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
167. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
168. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 53-54. Justice Stevens concurred separately in Pulley, rejecting
the Court's conclusion that no appellate review for arbitrariness or disproportionality of
death sentences was required but also rejecting the petitioner's view that a "comparative"
form of such review was required in all cases. Id. at 54-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment). In other opinions, Justice Stevens has commended statutory provisions that
require the state's highest court to assure that death sentences imposed in each case are
comparatively proportional to sentences imposed in all similar cases across the state. See,
e.g., Maggio v. Williams, 464 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890 (1983) (Stevens, J.); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203
(1976) (Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ., concurring).
169. MeCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315-19 ("If arbitrary and capricious punishment is the
touchstone under the Eighth Amendment, such a claim could-at least in theory-be based
upon any arbitrary variable, such as the defendant's facial characteristics, or the physical
attractiveness of the defendant or the victim, that some statistical study indicates may be
influential in jury decisionmaking. As these examples illustrate, there is no limiting
principle to the type of challenge brought by McCleskey." (footnotes omitted)).
170. See id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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capital-sentencing discretion is not only constitutionally permissible but
plays a "fundamental role in . . . [the] system"; (4) in tandem, the good
reasons to let the jury be the agency that exercises the discretion, together
with the ever-present "risk of racial prejudice influencing" a jury's decision
requires "'unceasing efforts' to eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal
justice system"; (5) "the Baldus study indicates a discrepancy that appears
to correlate [death sentencing] with race" and cannot be explained by any
other factor the state or Court could identify; and therefore, (6) "[i]n light
of' the above, "we hold that the Baldus study does not demonstrate a
constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital
sentencing process."' 7
Justice Powell's argument impresses us as building inexorably to the
opposite of the conclusion that his last sentence asserts: By revealing a
death-sentencing "discrepancy that appears to correlate with race" and
cannot otherwise be explained, the evidence exposes the "discriminatory
application" the Constitution forbids. The Baldus study thus revealed that
post-Furman decisions designed to wash discrimination out of capital
sentencing had failed precisely because a condition that plays a
"fundamental role" in the reformed sentencing systems-partially
discretionary juror decision making-also disposed the new systems to
"racial discrepancies."
A footnote that follows Justice Powell's concluding sentence begins to
provide the missing justification for the outcome he reaches. Justice
Brennan's "eloquent" statement of the constitutional problem, Justice
Powell says, is unconvincing because Justice Brennan has no solution to
discriminatory death sentencing short of his "often repeated" call for
abolition. 172 In other words, the Court's "'unceasing efforts' to eradicate
racial prejudice in our criminal justice system" must cease when necessary
to let states continue using the death penalty.1 73 Discomfort with that
answer may have led Justice Powell to up the ante in a final section, which
suggests that eradicating racial influences cannot be an unwavering
constitutional imperative else our entire "criminal justice system" would
have to give way. 174
171. Id. at 301, 303-04, 309, 311-13 (citation omitted).
172. Id. at 313 n.37.
173. Id. at 309. On the assumption that racial influences are intractable, hence that the
Court has no hope of eradicating them if the death penalty is allowed to continue, see Justice
Scalia's internal memorandum announcing that he would probably join Justice Powell's
majority opinion (as he ultimately did): "Since it is my view that the unconscious operation
of irrational sympathies and antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence)
prosecutorial decisions is real, acknowledged in the decisions of this Court, and ineradicable,
I cannot honestly say that all I need is more proof [of discrimination]." Henry J. Reske,
Behind the Scenes, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1993, at 28 (discussing Memorandum to the Conference
re: McCleskey v. Kemp, January 6, 1987, located in The Papers of Thurgood Marshall, Box
425, Folder 7).
174. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319; cf John C. Jeffries Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 451
(1994) (reporting that when Justice Powell was asked after he retired what vote he most
regretted, he answered, "McCleskey").
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Justice Stevens's McCleskey dissent made plain, however, that it was not
the survival of capital punishment-much less of organized society-that
depended on accepting racial disparity, but only the survival of Justice
White's more-is-better approach to the penalty. The Baldus study showed
that Georgia knew how to mete out sentences in murder cases without racial
discrepancies and had done so by imposing death sentences in many highly
aggravated cases and by imposing a lesser sentence in many highly
mitigated cases. Only in the mid-range cases, in which aggravation and
mitigation were relatively even, did race drive outcomes. As Justice
Stevens explained, by adopting a less-is-better approach to constitutional
capital sentencing-by requiring a high degree of aggravation net of
mitigation-the Court could remain steadfast in its efforts to eradicate
racial influences and fulfill Furman's promise without sacrificing the death
penalty or the social order: 175
[T]here exist certain categories of extremely serious crimes for which
prosecutors consistently seek, and juries consistently impose, the death
penalty without regard to the race of the victim or the race of the offender.
If Georgia were to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants to those
categories, the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of the
death penalty would be significantly decreased, if not eradicated. 17 6
In the July 2, 1976 cases, states adopting so-called guided discretion
statutes had assured the Court that their newly narrowed statutes would cure
the ills Furman had condemned. When the evidence presented in
McCleskey proved these predictions false as to a crucial pre-Furman ill-
the role of race in determining who lives and who dies-Justice Stevens
had no trouble explaining why. Although the July 2, 1976 cases had
approved guided discretion in principle, affirming the Florida, Georgia, and
Texas statutes "on their face,"' 177 the decisions left open the statutes'
constitutionality as applied. When more than a decade of applications
showed that the new procedures did not sufficiently limit the death penalty
to cases defined by net aggravation, as opposed to race, it was clear that
further narrowing was required. In rejecting this view, the five-person
McCleskey majority in effect overruled Justice Douglas's portion of the
Furman "holding" and made clear that the problem Justice Stewart had
discerned in Furman was not a prevailing concern. Justice White's quest
for numerousness had largely triumphed.
175. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The "death is different"
premise of death penalty jurisprudence in this country since the 1930s provided the Court
with an obvious explanation for demanding more in the way of race neutrality in
administering the death penalty than in administering the rest of the criminal justice system.
See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 405 (1993); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884-
85 (1983); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion); Stein
v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 196 (1953); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 752 (1948);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
176. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251
(1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976).
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D. Full Circle Back to Furman: The Cost of Mixing Narrowing and
Numerousness
The sentencing patterns that the Court's post-Furman decisions invite
have an even greater and more perverse effect on Furman than we have
suggested. Figure 10 depicts the death-sentencing pattern elicited by the
Court's post-Furman case law as of 2000 or so. Dots represent death
sentences jawboned out of jurors by the more-is-better approach to
aggravation that the Court has encouraged recently. Blank spaces represent
the cases jurors cast outside the capital-circle by the less-is-better approach
due to mitigation that the Court's earlier decisions require. The wedge is
the death-sentencing disparity (based on the race of the victim) that the
Baldus study revealed in McCleskey. The difference between Figures 1 and
10 is the return the nation has derived from thirty-five years of intensive
Supreme Court regulation of the death penalty.
Figure 1 Figure 10
The difference is minimal.
Given the removal of a smattering of death sentences for non-homicidal
offenses, Figure 10 is slightly smaller than Figure 1. And thanks to Justice
White, the proportion of death-eligible crimes that actually receive the
death penalty is somewhat greater. But otherwise things are much as they
were in 1972. For every defendant who received the death penalty, there
are many essentially identical offenders who did not (white space surrounds
almost every dot). 178 And racially skewed death-sentencing patterns (the
wedge) continue to exist, albeit now based on the race of the victim not (or
not only) the race of the defendant. 179
The Court thus has brought capital punishment full circle, almost
precisely back to where it stood nearly thirty-five years ago when the Court
embarked on an intensive effort to change capital punishment without
annihilating it. The only difference is that the pattern the states had
178. See David C. Baldus et al., Equal Justice and the Death Penalty: A Legal and
Empirical Analysis 229-48 (1990).
179. See id. at 248-66.
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generated on their own-the pattern found unconstitutional in Furman-is
now constitutionally required.
E. The Question Begged. Narrowing or Numerousness?
The incoherence of death penalty doctrine is not Justice White's fault, or
Justices Stewart's and Stevens's. Nor is the problem that the Court's
doctrine provides a role for discretion as well as for rules. 180 Rather, the
problem-the source of the pattern in Figure 1 0-is the intermingling of a
set of late 1970s/early 1980s decisions requiring anything-goes mitigation
in service of the Stewart-Stevens less-is-better approach to capital
sentencing with a set of late 1980s and 1990s doctrines allowing anything-
goes aggravation in keeping with Justice White's contradictory, more-is-
better approach.
The remainder of this Article addresses a question posed by our
conclusion that it was not sensible for the Court to construct its death
penalty doctrine out of two contradictory solutions to the problems
identified in Furman: Which of the two solutions-numerousness or
narrowing-should the Court have single-mindedly pursued? 181 Drawing
on a brief history of death penalty politics and practices in this country over
the last thirty-five years, we conclude that Justices Stewart and Stevens
were right, and Justice White was wrong. Numerousness breeds racial
disparity, invites error, risks execution of the innocent, and overtaxes the
system. Narrowing mitigates these problems.
IV. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEATH, 1972-2006
Thus far, we have suggested that the Court led other public actors in
setting the nation's course on the death penalty. The reality is more
complicated. In a number of respects, the Court has self-consciously
followed the public. We consider here whether it should do so again.
A. 1972-1994: Rising Support for the Death Penalty
Furman itself was both a reaction to public opinion on the death penalty
and the Court's attempt to clarify it. The decision came at a time when
public support for the death penalty seemed relatively weak in this country.
180. Cf supra notes 122-23.
181. Other questions are raised by our analysis to this point: What accounts for the
particular aspects of each of the competing doctrines the Court patched together into an
incoherent whole? Why in regard to the death penalty did the Court break with its practice
of leaving substantive criminal law (as opposed to criminal procedure) to the states? And
once the Court intervened, what kept it from abolishing the death penalty? These questions
are addressed in a forthcoming two-part article by Professor Liebman. James S. Liebman,
Slow-Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963-2006 Part 1:
The Court's Obsessive Search for and Flight from Responsibility (Feb. 21, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Professor Liebman); James S. Liebman, Part 2: Why
the Court Is Trapped in Its Dance with Death; How It Can Extricate Itself (Feb. 21, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Professor Liebman).
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According to a Gallup Organization poll three months before Furman was
decided, only fifty percent of those questioned favored the death penalty for
a person convicted of murder.182 In this light, the true, technical "holding"
of Furman-that the death penalty as then administered was
unconstitutional, without any decisive view being expressed about how to
fix it or whether it could be fixed-acted as a call for a national referendum
on the issue via the States' decisions whether to reinstate the death penalty
and, if so, in what form. That referendum, in turn, was resoundingly
supportive of capital punishment. Although a few formerly capital
jurisdictions (e.g., District of Columbia, Massachusetts) declined to bring
back the death penalty, and others (e.g., Kansas and New York) delayed
doing so for years, the vast majority of formerly capital states quickly
reinstated capital punishment via lopsided votes of their legislatures or
(e.g., in California and Oregon) lopsided votes of the public in voter
referenda. 183
Goaded perhaps by rising crime rates, support for the death penalty
climbed steadily after 1972. By the late 1980s when, for example,
McCleskey, Stanford, and Penry were decided, support for capital
punishment was in the seventy to seventy-nine percent range. Public
support for capital punishment reached a modem peak in the mid-1990s,
with eighty percent of those polled in 1994 supporting the death penalty. It
is not surprising, therefore, that it was during the late 1980s and early 1990s
period when Justice White's more-is-better approach to the death penalty
particularly flourished.184
The Court's move from "narrowing" to "numerousness" in turn affected
public activity on the death penalty. Emboldened by the Court's more-is-
better decisions, some states by legislation and judicial interpretation vastly
increased the number of statutory aggravating factors that were sufficient to
permit a death sentence,185 the breadth of interpretation of those factors, 186
182. Gallup Brain, Death Penalty,
http://institution.gallup.com/content/Default.aspx?ci=1 606 (last visited Jan. 12, 2006).
183. See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau, The Death Penalty in America 9 tbls.l-2 (1997)
(cataloguing dates of abolition, partial abolition, and restoration of death penalty, by state,
1946-1995).
184. See, e.g., David W. Moore, Public Divided Between Death Penalty and Life
Imprisonment Without Parole, The Gallup Organization, June 2, 2004,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=23&did= 1029 (providing results from
Gallup polls conducted between 1936 and 2004 of public support for the death penalty).
185. See, e.g., Report of the Illinois Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment 66
(2002) (discussing the increase from six to twenty in the number of aggravating factors
enumerated in an Illinois statute between 1977 and 2002); Kathleen D. Weron, Rethinking
Utah 's Death Penalty Statute: A Constitutional Requirement for the Substantive Narrowing
Aggravating Circumstances, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 1107, 1132 (discussing Utah's doubling of
its number of aggravating circumstances in 1983).
186. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance
in Capital Cases-The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 941, 943-44 (1986)
("Twenty-four states permit imposition of the death penalty based on a finding that the
murder was, in some ill-defined way, worse than other murders. The states use a variety of
terms to denote this aggravating circumstance, with most statutes containing, either alone or
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and their tolerance for outlier death verdicts-ones imposed for crimes and
on criminals who at most times or in most places were not thought to
warrant the ultimate penalty.' 87 As a result, variability among jurisdictions
in terms of the frequency with which they imposed the death penalty
increased. 18 8
B. 1995 to the Present: Qualms Based on Innocence and Error
Starting in the mid-1990s, however, public support for the death penalty
began to slip. Between 1994 and 2001, there was a slow but steady decline
in support for capital punishment, with a 2001 poll showing that support
had dropped to sixty-five percent. A major catalyst for the change in public
opinion was the increasing recognition that the capital punishment system,
which had been touted as the most fair and accurate system imaginable, had
in fact led to a series of death sentences for demonstrably innocent
individuals. In the mid-1990s, activists decided to focus on this issue as a
major reason for reform or abolition of the death penalty. 189 As will be
seen, this movement not only spawned concern about the actual guilt of
individuals who had been convicted for death-eligible offenses, it also
generated concern about the general fairness of a system that was capable
of such chronic and profound error.
Since time immemorial, opponents of the death penalty have pointed to
the risk of wrongful convictions as reason enough to abolish capital
in some combination, the terms 'especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,' 'depravity of mind,'
or 'outrageously vile wanton or inhuman.' These aggravating circumstances, [known as]
'especially heinous' aggravating circumstances, have generated more controversy than any
other aggravating circumstance.").
187. See, e.g., David Baldus, When Symbols Clash: Reflections on the Future of the
Comparative Proportionality Review of Death Sentences, 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1582, 1590
(1996); Leigh B. Beinen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts
After Gregg: Only "The Appearance of Justice?, " 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 130, 132-
33 (1996); Lawrence S. Lustberg & Lenora M. Lapidus, The Importance of Saving the
Universe: Keeping Proportionality Review Meaningful, 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1423, 1467-
68 (1996); Steven M. Sprenger, A Critical Evaluation of State Supreme Court
Proportionality Review in Death Sentence Cases, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 719, 732-33 (1988);
Penny J. White, Can Lightning Strike Twice? Obligations of State Courts After Pulley v.
Harris, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 813, 814 (1999).
188. See, e.g., James Liebman et al., A Broken System, Part II: Why There Is So Much
Error in Capital Cases and What Can Be Done About It 121 fig. 11 (2002), available at
http://ccjr.policy.net/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=26641.
189. For many abolitionists, the decision to promote factual innocence as a major vice of
the death penalty was a profoundly difficult one given the fear that a focus on innocence
would imply that execution of guilty defendants was acceptable. See generally Carole S.
Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and Limitation of
the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 587 (2005). Notwithstanding these legitimate concerns, virtually all major
abolitionist organizations have come to recognize the power of the innocence issue to expose
the public to a broad spectrum of problems associated with the death penalty that go well
beyond the risk of wrongful executions. Thus far, at least, support for the death penalty has
not rebounded in the manner these concerns might have suggested.
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punishment. 190 Many examples of questionable convictions in capital cases
bolstered this point. 191 Yet with some exceptions, 192 it was difficult to
develop evidence conclusive enough to persuade the general public that
those who were exonerated were indeed innocent. In the 1990's, this began
to change with the increased use of post-conviction DNA testing. Through
a series of exonerations based on forensic DNA testing, the public began to
acknowledge that innocent people were being convicted of crimes and even
being sentenced to death. 193
It was not the number of DNA exonerations that mattered. By 1995,
DNA testing had led to only three death row exonerations, and just twenty-
five exonerations of inmates serving sentences other than death. What
mattered was the message that the DNA cases drove home about the
system's general fallibility-including in cases where DNA testing was
unavailable. The overwhelming majority of capital cases are not
190.
To recognize the fallibility of human judgment and still to act, but act wisely in
the light to such fallibility, is one of the great challenges of mankind. For this
reason the fact of irrevocability has always been among the arguments for the
abolition of the death penalty .... It was brought up on all conceivable occasions
in the time span. . . of legislative consideration of the abolition of capital
punishment. In all probability it will continue to be brought up until capital
punishment has disappeared from the practice of civilized society.
Otto Pollak, The Errors of Justice, in Capital Punishment 207 (Thorsten Sellin ed., 1967);
see also United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 63 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[T]he argument that
innocent people may be executed ... has been central to the centuries old debate over both
the wisdom and the constitutionality of capital punishment.").
191. See Hugo Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 21, 35-36 (1987); Michael L. Radelet et al., Prisoners
Released from Death Rows Since 1970 Because of Doubts About Their Guilt, 13 T.M.
Cooley L. Rev. 907, 916-18 (1996); Richard C. Dieter, Death Penalty Information Center,
Innocence and the Crisis in the American Death Penalty (2004),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45&did=1 149.
192. The classic exceptions to this point were cases in which a defendant had been
convicted of murdering a victim, who later was discovered to be alive and well. For an
example of such a case which spawned widespread adoption of the corpus delicti rule in the
United States, see Robert Warden, Wilkie Collins's The Dead Alive (2005) (detailing the
1815 convictions of Jesse and Stephen Boom for the murder of Russell Colvin, who turned
out to be alive).
193. By 2003, seventy-three percent of those polled believed that an innocent person had
been executed within the previous five years. Interestingly, despite a growing number of
exonerations, that number dropped to fifty-nine percent in 2005. Even so, the idea that fifty-
nine percent of those polled believe that an innocent person had been executed is staggering.
Recently, considerable evidence has emerged that individuals executed in the last fifteen
years were indeed innocent. See Terry Ganey, Was the Wrong Man Executed?, St. Louis
Post Dispatch, July 11, 2005, at Al (discussing newly uncovered evidence that the killing
for which Missouri executed Larry Griffin in 1995 was committed by others); Steve Mills &
Maurice Possley, Texas Man Executed on Disproved Forensics, Chi. Trib., Dec. 9, 2004, at
Al (discussing forensic evidence that a fatal fire Cameron Todd Willinghmam was executed
in 2004 for having deliberately set was accidental); Lise Olsen, Did Texas Execute an
Innocent Man? Eyewitness Says He Felt Influenced by Police to ID Teen as the Killer, Hous.
Chron., Nov. 20, 2005, at Al (discussing newly developed evidence that the shooting for
which Texas executed Ruben Cantu in 1993 was committed by another man).
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susceptible to verification through any sort of DNA testing because there is
no biological evidence left by the perpetrator that can be tested with
currently available technologies. 194 Once courts, governors, legislators, and
juries came to understand the flaws that DNA revealed, however, they
became far more receptive to claims of innocence that were not supported
by DNA. 195
A related phenomenon played a supporting role in rising doubts about the
death penalty: high rates of reversible error found by courts reviewing
capital verdicts. A study published in 2000 revealed that sixty-eight percent
of the thousands of death verdicts imposed and fully reviewed in the United
States between 1973 and 1995 were reversed because of legal error. 196 The
vast majority of these reversals were based on errors found to have
undermined the reliability of the guilt or sentencing determination-mainly,
ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and
misinstruction of jurors.197 Ninety-five percent of the errors were found by
state judges elected by constituencies that strongly supported the death
penalty or by panels of federal judges on which a majority of those voting
to reverse were appointed by Republican, "law-and-order" Presidents.' 98
On retrial following reversal, where data were available, eighty-two percent
of the death verdicts that were reversed were replaced by sentences less
than death, including nine percent in which the previously death-sentenced
defendants were acquitted. 199
The reasons for these reversals, the judges responsible for them, and
results on retrial following reversal suggested that the errors were by and
large serious-the kind that could cause the execution of people whose
crimes did not warrant the death penalty or who committed no crime at all.
194. Indeed, of the 121 death-row exonerations since Furman, only fourteen have
involved DNA testing. See Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence: List of Those
Freed from Death Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=6&did=110 (last
visited Jan. 12, 2006). For accounts of death row inmates exonerated as a result of DNA,
see Tim Junkin, Bloodsworth: The True Story of the First Death Row Inmate Exonerated by
DNA (2004); Barry Scheck et al., Actual Innocence: Five Days To Execution and Other
Dispatches from the Wrongly Convicted 126-57 (2000).
195. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, The New Death Penalty Debate: What's DNA Got to
Do with It?, 33 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 527 (2002). In this way, the DNA cases have
helped pave the way for many non-DNA exonerations. Recently, though, concern has
grown that judges and prosecutors will demand DNA evidence before they will be willing to
recognize that a defendant has been wrongly convicted. This phenomenon, sometimes
called the CSI effect (after the popular television show involving forensic evidence) has the
potential to wreak great harm, particularly once the numbers of post-conviction DNA
exonerations decrease as a result of widespread pretrial use of DNA technology.
196. Liebman et al., supra note 188, at 6; Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System: The
Persistent Patterns of Reversals of Death Sentences in the United States, 1 J. Empirical
Legal Stud. 209, 213-17 (2004).
197. Gelman, supra note 196, at 218-20.
198. Id. at 221-23.
199. Id. at 221.
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The findings generated questions about the accuracy of capital verdicts
across a wide spectrum of observers.200
C. The Public Drive for Reform
These developments fueled a movement to reform the post-Furman
capital justice system. Fears about the death penalty's reliability and
shrinking public support for capital punishment led policy makers to
recognize that the system needed serious improvement. 20 1 Notwithstanding
the Supreme Court's increasingly expansive approach to the death penalty,
some legislatures and officials began to consider whether it was necessary
to limit application of the death penalty beyond what the courts required.
There are myriad examples of how these newfound concerns about the
fairness and accuracy of the death penalty affected public policy. In some
states, legislatures enacted measures; in others they proposed moratoria or
created study commission to assess methods of addressing the problems;
and in two states, governors imposed moratoria.
200. See, e.g., David S. Broder, Broken Justice, Wash. Post, June 18, 2000, at B7 ("That
[the study's findings demonstrate the system is working] might be plausible if one out of a
hundred or even one out of ten capital cases were handled in such a slipshod fashion as to
merit reversal. But when two-thirds of them involve 'serious error' in the eyes of reviewing
state and federal judges, Liebman is justified in saying, 'By anyone's standards, this is not a
system that is working."'); David Gergen, Death by Incompetence, U.S. News & World
Rep., June 26, 2000, at 76 ("[L]ast week.., brought forward a stunning report from a team
of researchers at the Columbia Law School ... [revealing] that appeals courts determined
that an astonishing sixty-eight percent of the cases had prejudicial errors and should be
reversed."); Gara LaMarche, Ending Executions, Am. Prospect, June 4, 2001,
http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleld=5730
("Sam Millsap, the former district attorney for San Antonio... recently called for a
moratorium on executions. Why? Because he was influenced by the work of Columbia Law
School [researchers], who spent years on a study of the error rate in capital convictions.");
Murder One, Economist, June 17, 2000, at 33 ("The huge proportion of first trials that are
later set aside also represents a gigantic waste of money. It may sound callous to count the
cost when lives are at stake but the criminal-justice system, like everything else, is subject to
financial pressures. Money thrown down the drain on recklessly inefficient early
proceedings is money not available for combating murder elsewhere."); James Q. Wilson,
What Death-Penalty Errors?, N.Y. Times, July 10, 2000, at A19 ("For those who support
capital punishment, as I do, the possibility that innocent people could be executed is
profoundly disturbing .... [Even] if perfection is not possible .... the number of errors
ought to [be] kept as low as possible. For that reason, it is worth studying 'Broken System:
Error Rates in Capital Cases,' the recent . . . Columbia University Law School
[report] .... ").
201. This recognition of the need for reform also implicates non-death cases. As Justice
Stevens recently explained, "with the benefit of DNA evidence, we have learned that a
substantial number of death sentences have been imposed erroneously. That evidence is
. profoundly significant-not only because of its relevance to the debate about the wisdom of
continuing to administer capital punishment, but also because it indicates that there must be
serious flaws in our administration of criminal justice." Stevens, supra note 1.
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In 1998, Kentucky enacted the Racial Justice Act,20 2 requiring pretrial
procedures in capital cases so trial courts could determine whether race was
playing a part in prosecutors' decisions to seek the death penalty. The Act
allowed admission of statistical evidence and other evidence showing that
death sentences were sought more frequently against persons of one race
than of another, or were sought more frequently as punishment for offenses
against persons of one race than as punishment for crimes against persons
of another race. 20 3 If a court "finds that race was the basis of the decision
to seek the death sentence, the court shall order that a death sentence shall
not be sought. '20 4 In enacting this legislation, Kentucky did precisely what
the Court in McCleskey had refused to do.20 5
Between 1989 and 2001, fifteen states that had earlier allowed the
execution of mentally retarded defendants amended their statutes to bar
such executions. 20 6
Between 1989 and 2004, five states that had earlier allowed executions
for crimes committed by juveniles amended their statutes to bar such
executions.207
In 1999, the Nebraska Legislature voted to impose a moratorium on all
executions so that a study commission could examine all aspects of the
death penalty's application in the state. Governor Mike Johanns vetoed the
bill, but the Legislature proceeded with a major study of the state's death
penalty. 208
In 1999, legislators in twelve states introduced bills to abolish the death
penalty. 209
202. See Racial Justice Act Becomes Law: Not Soft On Crime, But Strong On Justice,
Advocate, July 1998, at 5 (discussing the Kentucky legislature's adoption of SB 171, which
creates a pretrial procedure for judicial consideration of whether race had an influence on the
decision to prosecute the case capitally).
203. At the time of the Act's passage, seven of thirty-three people on Kentucky's death
row were African-American (21% of death row population in a state with a 7.7% non-white
population), and all victims of the seven inmates were white. See id.
204. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.300(4) (LexisNexis 2005).
205. It also bears noting that in 2003, Kentucky Governor Paul Patton commuted to life
imprisonment the death sentence of Kevin Stanford, the petitioner in Stanford v. Kentucky,
on the ground of his age at the time of the crime. See Tom Loftus, Patton Has Short, Quiet
Last Day as Governor, Courier-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Dec. 9, 2003, at lB.
206. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-15 (2002) (discussing statutes enacted in
Kentucky, Tennessee, New Mexico, Arkansas, Colorado, Washington, Indiana, Kansas,
Nebraska, South Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, and North Carolina).
207. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1193 (2005).
208. See Robynn Tysver, Veto Not End of Issue: Moratorium Idea Spreads, Omaha
World Herald, May 27, 1999, at 1.
209. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty Moratorium
Movement in the United States, 73 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2002) (noting that twelve states in
1999 introduced bills to abolish the death penalty, which was a significant increase from
four states in 1998); see also A Gathering Momentum: Continuing Impacts of the American
Bar Association Call for a Moratorium on Executions, 2000 A.B.A. Sec. Individual Rts. &
Resp. 1, 76-96 (noting that between August 1998 and November 1999, thirteen states
introduced legislation to abolish the death penalty: Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
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In 2000, Illinois became the first state actually to impose a moratorium
on executions, when Governor George Ryan declared that, pending the
results of a study he was commissioning, he would grant a reprieve to any
inmate on death row who was scheduled for execution. This decision came
in the shadow of several high-profile exonerations of death row inmates in
Illinois. By the time Governor Ryan imposed the moratorium, thirteen
condemned prisoners had been exonerated since Furman, in a state in
which twelve had been executed. Governor Ryan appointed a bipartisan,
Blue Ribbon Commission, charging it to examine every aspect of the
capital punishment system in Illinois. 210
In 2000, the New Hampshire Legislature passed a bill to abolish the
death penalty in the State. As in Nebraska, the Governor vetoed the
measure, but with its vote, the New Hampshire Legislature became the first
legislature to pass a repeal measure since Furman.211
Between 2001 and 2003, important studies of the operation of the death
penalty with an eye towards reform were also conducted by Arizona,
Indiana, Maryland, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and
the United States Department of Justice. 212
Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, and Texas).
210. See, e.g., Alan Berlow, Death in Texas: The Capital of Capital Punishment Should
Heed Illinois's Example, Wash. Post, Feb. 13, 2000, at B5 (describing Governor Ryan's
actions and noting that in announcing that he would not approve any more death sentences
until a review of Illinois's capital punishment system was conducted, Ryan said, "I cannot
support a system, which, in its administration, has proven to be so fraught with error and has
come so close to the ultimate nightmare, the state's taking of innocent life").
211. See Rachel M. Collins, N.H. Lawmakers Seek Death Penalty Ban But Governor Says
She'd Veto Plan, Boston Globe, May 5, 2000, at B2.
212. See Hon. David S. Baime, Report to the Supreme Court, Systemic Proportionality
Review Project: 2000-2001 Term 5 (2001) ("[T]here is unsettling statistical evidence
indicating that cases involving killers of White victims are more likely to progress to a
penalty trial than cases involving killers of African-American victims."); David C. Baldus et
al., The Disposition of Nebraska Capital and Non-Capital Homicide Cases (1973-1999): A
Legal and Empirical Analysis 96-100 (2001) (finding that defendants who killed victims of a
high socioeconomic status were almost six times more likely to be sentenced to death than
victims of low socioeconomic status); Final Report of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Committee on Racial and Gender Bias in the Justice System (2003), available at
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/Index/supreme/BiasCmte/FinalReport.pdf (recommending an
overhaul of Pennsylvania's capital punishment system, including imposing a moratorium on
executions until policies and procedures are implemented to ensure the death penalty is
administered in a fair and impartial manner); Rachel King et al., Broken Justice: The Death
Penalty in Virginia (2003) (urging the Virginia legislature, courts, and governor to consider
a number of recommendations geared towards improving Virginia's capital punishment
system); Janet Napolitano, Office of the Attorney Gen., State of Ariz., Capital Case
Commission Final Report 14 (2002) ("The Commission unanimously agrees that additional
resources must be made available for capital cases.. . and urges the Legislature to consider
and pass legislation appropriating monies for capital litigation resources at the earliest
possible opportunity."); Raymond Paternoster et al., An Empirical Analysis of Maryland's
Death Sentencing System With Respect to the Influence of Race and Legal Jurisdiction
(2003), available at http://www.newsdesk.umd.edu/pdf/finalrep.pdf (documenting the
impact of race and geography on the imposition of the death penalty in Maryland); Isaac
Unah & John Charles Boger, Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina: An Empirical
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In 2002, the Illinois Governors' Commission on Capital Punishment
issued its report, calling for eighty-five reforms of the State's capital-justice
system. Even then, the Commission concluded, it could not guarantee that
these reforms would eliminate many of the vices-including the
condemnation of innocent defendants-that had plagued the death
penalty. 213
In 2003, Illinois Governor George Ryan commuted the sentences of all
167 death row inmates on death row.214 In his address announcing the
commutations, Governor Ryan highlighted the relationship between
wrongful convictions and the general question of the death penalty's
fairness: "The facts that I've seen in reviewing each and every one of these
cases questions not only .. .the innocence of people on death row, but
[also] the fairness of the death penalty system as a whole."215
In 2001, even Texas, the avowed capital punishment capital of the United
States, joined a number of other death-sentencing jurisdictions in making
better qualified, trained, and funded lawyers available in capital cases.216
And in 2005, after years of resistance by Governors George W. Bush and
Rick Perry, the latter signed into Texas law a provision allowing capital
jurors to opt for life without parole instead of death as the punishment for
capital murder. 217 This action brought Texas into line with a nearly
unanimous movement across the country to give capital jurors an explicit
life-without-parole option. As then-Governor Bush noted in opposing
previous versions of this legislation, its effect is to limit the extent to which
future-dangerousness concerns jawbone death sentences out of jurors in
Analysis, 1993-1997 (2001) ("[T]he race of the homicide victim-played a statistically
significant role in determining who received death sentences in North Carolina during the
1973-1997 period. The odds of receiving a death sentence rose by 3.5 times or more among
those defendants (of whatever race) who murdered white persons."); see also Liebman,
supra note 195, 527-28 (discussing studies).
213. See, e.g., I11. Comm'n on Capital Punishment, Report of the Governor's Commission
on Capital Punishment (2002), available at
http://www.state.il.us/defender/report/completereport.pdf (reporting the recommendations
of the Commission to the Illinois Governor); Jodi Wilgoren, Panel in Illinois Seeks to
Reform Death Sentence, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 2002, at Al.
214. One day earlier, Governor Ryan pardoned four death-row inmates on the ground of
factual innocence. See Robert E. Pierre & Kari Lydersen, Illinois Death Row Emptied;
Citing 'Demon of Error,'Ryan Commutes Sentences, Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 2003, at Al; Jeff
Flock, 'Blanket Commutation' Empties Illinois Death Row, CNN.com, Jan. 13, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/01/1 1/illinois.death.row/index.html.
215. Governor George Ryan, Commutation Announcement (Jan. 11, 2003), available at
http://www.law.northwestem.edu/news/spring03/ryanspeech.html.
216. See, e.g., Terry Brooks & Shubhangi Deoras, Texas Enacts Landmark Reforms,
Crim. Just., Fall 2001, at 56; Armando Villafranca, Senator, Urban Counties Feuding Over
Fair Defense Bill, Hous. Chron., Feb. 13, 2003, at A35.
217. See, e.g., Janet Elliott & Polly Ross Hughes, Life Without Parole Among Raft Of
Bills Signed By Perry, Hous. Chron., June 18, 2005, at Al; Jim Vertuno, Perry Signs Life




marginal cases where the defendant's assured confinement in prison is
sufficient to allay juror fears.2 18
In 2005, in the aftermath of a New York Court of Appeals decision
holding New York's death penalty procedures unconstitutional, the Code
Committee of the New York General Assembly refused to pass a measure
that would have cured the defect and reinstated the death penalty. Members
of the Committee made clear that revelations of the previous several
years-particularly involving innocent defendants on death row-had
persuaded them that the State was better off without capital punishment.219
In 2006, the New Jersey Legislature became the first in the nation to
declare a moratorium on executions, again influenced in part by a fear of
executing the innocent.220
It is difficult to exaggerate the significance of these developments or the
extent to which they reflect a reversal of positions between the Court and
popularly accountable state officials. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, it
had been the states pushing for increased use of the death penalty, and the
Court putting up some resistance. Even thereafter, as the Court came
around to Justice White's more-is-better approach, it was the states that
were urging the Court along. States that entered the post-Furman era with
statutes listing only a handful of aggravating factors consistently expanded
the array of crimes and conditions that made a defendant death-penalty-
218. See Clay Robison, Bush Defends Texas' Criminal Justice System, Hous. Chron.,
Feb. 6, 1998, at A33 (describing then-Governor George W. Bush's response to polls
demonstrating that approximately half of Texans favored giving jurors a life without parole
sentencing option in capital cases, namely, that life without parole "weakens the death
penalty"). The Supreme Court has required jurors to be informed when the alternative to a
death sentence is life without the possibility of parole, but the Court has not required them to
be informed if the alternative to a death sentence is a life sentence in which parole is
possible-even if (as in Texas, prior to the recent change) parole is not possible for thirty-
five years and thereafter is highly unlikely. See Brown v. Texas, 522 U.S. 940, 941 (1997)
(Stevens, J., respecting the denial of the petition for the writ certiorari); Simmons v. South
Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 170-71, 177-78 (1994) (providing that, at least in states in which
future dangerousness is a relevant factor in capital sentencing, jurors must be informed that
capital murderers will receive a penalty of life without parole if they are not sentenced to
die); cf. Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 178, 182, 196-97 (2000) (holding, over Justice
Stevens's dissent, that the trial court properly denied an instruction informing the jury of the
life without parole option, where the state scheduled the defendant's trial ahead of the
hearing on another offense at which judgment was entered making the defendant parole
ineligible for his capital murder); Brown, 522 U.S. at 941 (Stevens, J., respecting the denial
of the petition for the writ of certiorari) (questioning the distinction the Court has drawn
between parole ineligibility for the remainder of the prisoner's life, about which penalty-
phase jurors must be informed in capital cases, and parole ineligibility for a term of years-
here, thirty-five years-about which the Court has not required capital jurors to be
informed).
219. See, e.g., Michael Powell, In N. Y., Lawmakers Vote Not to Reinstate Capital
Punishment, Wash. Post, Apr. 13, 2005, at A3; see also Michael Powell, N.Y. Assembly
Debating Fate of State Death Penalty, Wash. Post, Feb. 12, 2005, at A3.
220. See Michael Booth, Codey Leaves Office with a Flair, Signing Bevy of Bills into
Law, 183 N.J. L.J. 139 (2006) (discussing New Jersey's law imposing a moratorium on
executions); Death and the Law (2): A Matter of Evidence, Economist, Jan. 21, 2006, at 81
(similar).
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eligible. That by the turn of the century many states were examining the
need for reform, while the Court remained steadfast in its more-is-better
stance, is powerful testament to the change in climate around the issue. At
no time since Furman has the climate been as ripe as today for significant
reforms.
V. NARROWING AS A CURE FOR WHAT AILS THE DEATH PENALTY
As the Court itself did in Furman, when it took the nation's pulse on the
death penalty, we consider here what the recent reforms say about the
Court's approach to the death penalty, and especially about the
numerousness-versus-narrowing debate. We conclude that the recent
actions by legislators, prosecutors, and jurors reveal a trend towards
narrowing and away from numerousness. More broadly, we conclude that
numerousness is a likely cause of the problems that motivate the trend, and
additional narrowing is a promising if only partial cure.
A. Lessons on the Ground
1. Legislative Activity
Some of the recent legislative reforms of the death penalty fall into the
category of narrowing measures. For example, a number of states recently
limited the reach of the death penalty by excluding two categories of
offenders-juveniles and mentally retarded individuals-from death
eligibility. 221 Likewise, the trend towards providing better trial lawyers in
capital cases and offering jurors an explicit life-without-parole alternative
to death suggests a preference for sentences less than death in marginal
cases in which the quality of one's lawyer and available sentencing options
are most likely to influence jurors.222
Nonetheless, a striking aspect of recent reform activity is how little of it
has involved the straightforward narrowing of death-eligibility factors.
Even as many legislatures have examined flaws in their death-penalty
systems, and even as study commissions have called for narrowed capital-
eligibility criteria,223 the states have taken virtually no steps to restrict their
statutory lists of factors that render a defendant eligible for capital
punishment, and some states have continued to expand their lists.224
221. See supra Part IV.C.3.
222. See generally Norman Lefstein, Reform of Defense Representation in Capital Cases:
The Indiana Experience and Its Implications for the Nation, 29 Ind. L. Rev. 495, 529 (1996)
(discussing the drop in capital prosecutions in marginal cases caused by Indiana legislation
improving counsel and defense support services in capital cases); supra note 218 and
accompanying text (discussing the effect in marginal cases of a life-without-parole
alternative to the death penalty).
223. See supra notes 202-20 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., Thomas P. Bonczar & Tracy L. Snell, Capital Punishment, 2002, Bureau
of Justice Statistics Bulletin (U.S. Bureau of Justice Stats., Wash. D.C.), Nov. 2003, at 3
(noting that in 2002, Virginia "[a]dded as an aggravating factor deliberate killing of any
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2. Actions by Prosecutors and Jurors
To achieve a complete picture of what is happening in the States, it is
essential to look beyond legislative activity and to examine how prosecutors
and sentencing jurors have "voted with their feet" on the death penalty in
recent years. The results of this inquiry are quite stark. Most importantly,
the number of death sentences being imposed in the United States has fallen
dramatically since the post-Furman peak years of 1994 (314 death
sentences), 1995 (318 death sentences), and 1996 (320 death sentences).
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person in the commission of an act of terrorism" (citing Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(13)
(2002))); Tracy L. Snell & Laura M. Maruschak, Capital Punishment, 2001, Bureau of
Justice Statistics Bulletin (U.S. Bureau of Justice Stats., Wash. D.C.), Dec. 2002, at 2 (noting
that in 2001, Connecticut added as an aggravating factor murder to avoid arrest or
prosecution (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54b(i)(8) (2001))); Tracy L. Snell, Capital
Punishment, 2000, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin (U.S. Bureau of Justice Stats., Wash.
D.C.), Dec. 2001, at 2 (noting that, in 2000, Colorado "[a]dded as an aggravating factor use
of a weapon during a Class I felony when use of the weapon itself constituted a felony under
State or Federal law" (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-103(5)(o) (2000))); Tracy L. Snell,
Capital Punishment, 1999, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin (U.S. Bureau of Justice
Stats., Wash. D.C.), Dec. 2000, at 2 (noting that in 1999, Alabama "[a]dded to the criminal
code as aggravating circumstances murder of two or more persons in the course of one
'scheme' and murder that was one of a series of intentional killings committed by the
defendant" (citing Ala. Code § 13A-5-49(9), (10) (1999))); Tracy L. Snell, Capital
Punishment, 1998, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin (U.S. Bureau of Justice Stats., Wash.
D.C.), Dec 1999, at 2-3 [hereinafter Snell, Capital Punishment, 1998]. The 1998 report
found that in that year, Indiana "[aldded to its penal code as an aggravating factor killing a
pregnant woman" (citing Ind. Code § 35-20-2-9(b)(16) (1998)); Nebraska "added as an
aggravating factor murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of
official duties where the defendant had knowledge of the victim's occupation" (citing Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 29-2523(1)(i) (1998)); and Washington "[a]dded as aggravating factors murder
of a person who had a protective order filed against the defendant and murder of a person
with whom the defendant shared a household when the defendant also had a history of 3 or
more prior harassment or criminal assault offenses against the victim" (citing Wash. Rev.
Code § 10.95.020(13), (14) (1998)). Snell, Capital Punishment, 1998, supra, at 2-3.
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Those three years saw only a slightly higher number of sentences
imposed than during the period from 1982, by which year most post-
Furman capital-sentencing statutes were up and running, and 1999, when
an average of 283 death sentences were imposed annually. By contrast, in
2001 and 2002, the number of defendants sentenced to death dropped to
163 and 168, respectively. In 2003, the number fell to 152, by 2004, the
number was 125, and in 2005 the number of death sentences was at an all
time post-Furman low of ninety-six. The average number of sentences
during the 2001-2005 period (141) were less than fifty of the average death
sentences per year compared to the 1982-1999 period, and just forty-six
percent of the average number of death sentences imposed per year during
the peak period of 1994-1998 (when 305 death sentences were imposed
each year on average).
Although many factors may fuel this decrease in capital verdicts, a major
one is a newfound resolve among prosecutors to reserve capital
prosecutions to the "worst of the worst" murders. As Joshua Marquis, an
Oregon prosecutor who has served as a National District Attorneys
Association spokesman on the death penalty and chair of its Capital
Litigation Committee, explained recently, "The point we're coming to in
America is that we are going to keep refining and refining and refining
those who are eligible for the death penalty .... It should really be reserved
for people like (Oklahoma City bomber) Timothy McVeigh. ' '225
Virginia Governor James Gilmore expressed the same sentiment,
observing that the death penalty should be "reserved only for the worst
possible cases." 22 6 Along these same lines, Professor Robert Blecker, an
outspoken supporter of the death penalty, has written that "the vast majority
of the 3,700 murderers on death row today should, instead, spend the rest of
their lives in prison. Our responsibility is to figure out who should be
included in that small minority-the very worst of the worst-who deserve
to die."227
B. Numerousness as the Cause; Narrowing as the Cure
The trend toward narrowing the death penalty to the worst of the worst
offenses is a promising response to all of the major concerns that recently
have generated skepticism about the death penalty. Narrowing the bases for
a death sentence and linking decisions to a reliable assessment of
aggravation net of mitigation-all in classic Stewart-Stevens, less-is-better
fashion--can help ameliorate (1) the risk that innocent or other legally
225. Michael Conlon, U.S. Death Sentences Begin to Decline, Reuters, July 15, 2003,
available at http://www.cjcj.org/press/sentencesdecline.html (quoting Marquis, explaining
the decline in death sentences).
226. See A Governor's Role in Death Penalty Cases, Burden of Proof with Greta Van
Susteren (CNN television broadcast Aug. 21, 2001).
227. Robert Blecker, Among Killers, Searching for the Worst of the Worst, Wash. Post,
Dec. 3, 2000, at B 1; Robert Blecker & James S. Liebman, Op-Ed, Let's Break the Impasse
on Death Penalty, Hous. Chron., May 25, 2003, at 1C.
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undeserving defendants will be sentenced to die and executed, (2) racial
disparity, (3) other forms of arbitrariness, and (4) the overtaxing of
resources that exacerbates all of these problems.
1. Error and Execution of the Innocent
There are two ways in which narrowed aggravating factors, a substantial
degree of aggravation net of (full) mitigation, and other less-is-better
techniques can address concerns about executing the innocent. First,
assuming there is a static error rate, a reduction in the absolute number of
death sentences imposed will yield a proportional reduction in the incidence
of errors. Second, evidence reveals that reducing the numerousness of
capital prosecutions and verdicts tends to decrease the rate of error as well.
Even if one assumes a static error rate, a reduction in the number of
overall death sentences will generate a reduction in the number of innocent
defendants sentenced to die. Hypothetically assuming an error rate of five
percent, reducing the gross number of death sentences imposed in the
country from 300 per year to sixty per year will reduce the number of
innocent defendants sentenced to death from fifteen to three.
If one is to believe the polls, most Americans continue to support capital
punishment, though a strong majority believes that innocent people have
been executed. 228 People thus may believe some risk of error is tolerable if
the only alternative is abandoning the death penalty altogether. But this
hardly reveals a national consensus in favor of executing innocent
defendants in cases far removed from the small core of "worst of the worst"
cases that mainly drive support for continued use of the penalty. On the
contrary, narrowing death eligibility to the core of the circle would permit
the public to maintain a death penalty while reducing significantly its
concerns about error and wrongful execution.
The effects of narrowing are more significant than that, however, because
the rate of error is not actually static. As the frequency of capital
proceedings goes up in a given jurisdiction so does the rate of error.229 A
comprehensive effort to explain differences in rates of reversible error in
capital cases across states and years found that "higher death-sentencing
rates-death sentences per 1000 homicides-are associated with a higher
probability of reversal of any death verdict that is imposed." 230
Numerousness in death sentencing breeds error, which in turn undermines
the reliability of guilt and sentencing outcomes and increases the risk of
executing the undeserving and the factually innocent. As is depicted by
228. See supra note 193.
229. The relationship between high capital-sentencing rates and high capital-error rates
was first documented in John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty
Appeals, and Case Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 465, 469, 496 (1999)
(finding a "strong, significant correlation. .. between death-[sentencing] behavior and
[appellate] relief from death sentences"); accord Gelman et al., supra note 196, at 241-42.
230. Gelman et al., supra note 196, at 241.
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Figure 1 1 below, "[w]hen other factors are held constant at their average
values, the predicted probability of reversal [based on serious error]
increases about seven-fold when moving from states and years with the
fewest to those with the most death sentences imposed per 1,000
homicides." 231 The same pattern appears at the county level. Whether
comparing counties with similar numbers of death sentences or similar
numbers of homicides, it is consistently the case that jurisdictions with
higher death-sentencing rates have substantially higher rates of reversible
error in the capital verdicts they impose and are much more likely to
convict and condemn defendants who are later found to be not guilty.232
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In short, narrowing the categories of death-eligible offenses, which in
turn reduces the frequency with which death is sought in a jurisdiction,
serves not only to reduce the gross number of errors, but the rate of errors
as well. Although errors inevitably will continue to occur-including some
that may occur precisely because of the aggravated quality of the worst
cases 233 -the number and risk will recede.
231. Id.
232. See Liebman et al., supra note 188, at 290 tbl.10A, 291 tbl.1OB, 294 tbl.13A, 295
tbls.13B, 13C, 297 tbl.14A, 298 tbl.14B, 299 tbl.14C, 301 tbl.15, 304 tbl.16, B-1 tbl.11A, B-
6 tbl.11B, B-II tbl.12.
233. See Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are
Common in Capital Cases, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 469, 478 (1996) (hypothesizing that the
incidence of police and prosecutorial misconduct may increase in response to particularly




With regard to the impact of race, Justice Stevens's dissent in McCleskey
and the Baldus study presented in that case make a compelling showing that
narrowing death-eligibility can significantly lessen the impact of race in
capital sentencing. As Justice Stevens pointed out, when aggravation is
extraordinarily severe, juries impose death sentences regardless of the race
of the victim or perpetrator. 234 David Baldus and his coauthors would later
write with reference to Justice Stevens's position that "[a] ruling in
McCleskey that limited death sentencing to only those cases in which death
sentences are routinely sought and imposed would have imported a greater
degree of rationality and consistency into state death-sentencing systems
than any of the other procedural safeguards that the Supreme Court has
heretofore endorsed. '235
Unfortunately, even with strict narrowing of death eligibility, racial
biases may still affect the guilt-innocence determination. As Justice White
pointed out, a jury's discretion to find mitigating circumstances surrounding
even the most aggravated murder may enable it to treat race or other
illegitimate factors, for example, the low social status of the victim, as a
basis for sparing even the worst offenders from the death penalty. 236
Narrowing, again, is not a cure-all. It is, however, a potent tool for
reducing significantly the impact of race in capital cases.
3. Arbitrariness
Despite the promise of the post-Furman "guided discretion" statutes, the
problem of arbitrariness continues to plague capital sentencing. Studies,
many conducted by the states themselves, show persistent disparities
between rural and urban areas and outcomes that generally defy reason.237
234. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 367 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235. Baldus et al., supra note 178, at 385.
236. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 623 (1978) (White, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) ("By requiring... that sentencing authorities be permitted to consider and
in their discretion to act upon any and all mitigating circumstances, the Court permits them
to refuse to impose the death penalty no matter what the circumstances of the crime. This
invites a return to the pre-Furman days when the death penalty was generally reserved for
those very few for whom society has least consideration.").
237. Governor Ryan discussed this problem in his commutation address:
Should geography be a factor in determining who gets the death sentence? I don't
think it should. But in Illinois it makes a difference. You are five times more
likely to get a death sentence for ... first-degree murder in the rural areas of the
state than you are ... in Cook County. Five times more. Where's the fairness in
that? Where is the fairness in the justice system?
Ryan, supra note 215; see also Glenn Pierce & Michael Radelet, The Impact of Legally
Inappropriate Factors on Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990-99, 46 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 1, 37-40 (2005); Rachel King & Jason Stramaglia, ACLU Capital Punishment
Project, American Civil Liberties Union Report on the Anniversary of Furman v. Georgia:
Three Decades Later: Why We Need a Temporary Halt on Executions 10 (2003) (listing
and discussing a number of studies on geography and the death penalty); Pam Belluck,
Nebraska Is Said To Use Death Penalty Unequally, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 2001, at A15
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On the other hand, when death eligibility is truly limited to the "worst of
the worst" crimes and defendants-to cases in which jurors almost always
impose death absent extraordinary mitigation evidence-much of the
arbitrariness seems to evaporate. 238
This of course was Justice Stewart's principal insight in Furman. But it
has turned out that the narrowing statutes the Court approved "on their
face" in the July 2, 1976 cases were not narrow enough to curb arbitrary
prosecutorial decisions on when to seek death or arbitrary jury decision on
when to impose it. Since 1976, moreover, and with the encouragement of
the Court's more-is-better decisions of the late 1980s and 1990s, the States
have greatly exacerbated the problem through ever-growing statutory lists
and ever-broader interpretations of aggravating factors. If the goal of
reducing arbitrariness is to be taken seriously, therefore, either the states or
the Court will have to narrow death-eligibility factors further.
4. Availability of Resources
It is widely recognized that a major flaw in the administration of the
death penalty in most states is the quality of counsel and investigative
resources provided to indigent defendants.239 Enhancing the quality of
legal representation and defense services is a powerful response to the
problem of wrongful convictions and other flaws in the administration of
capital punishment.240 But (with a few exceptions such as Illinois, Indiana,
(discussing a study commissioned by the Nebraska state legislature: "Prosecutors in ... the
Omaha and Lincoln areas . . . were more likely to seek the death penalty and were more
likely to take death penalty cases to trial rather than accept plea bargains" than prosecutors
in rural counties); Susan Levine & Lori Montgomery, Large Racial Disparity Found By
Study of Md. Death Penalty, Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 2003, at Al (describing a study
commissioned by the Maryland governor: "[G]eography proved [a significant factor]
because of widely different practices by the state's attorneys in various jurisdictions .... A
death sentence was 26 times as likely ... in Baltimore City and 14 times as likely ... in
Montgomery County"); Richard Willing & Gary Fields, Geography of the Death Penalty,
USA Today, Dec. 20, 1999, at 1A ("The odds that a convicted killer will be sentenced to
death vary dramatically from state to state and even from county to county within many
states" and that "[u]rban counties with large minority populations are likely to have more
murders and higher murder rates than suburban counties but often send fewer people to
death row.").
238. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
239. See generally M. Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation's Death
Belt, Nat'l L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30 (studying death penalty representation in the South and
concluding that capital trials are "more like a random flip of the coin than a delicate
balancing of scales," because the defense attorney is "too often.., ill-trained, unprepared
[and] grossly underpaid").
240. See generally Lefstein, supra note 222.
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and Texas24 I) it has been difficult to persuade legislators to increase
spending on capital defense. 242
Narrowing can help address this problem. When a jurisdiction
prosecutes scores of capital prosecutions in any given year, the resources
available for funding of counsel or investigators are limited by the need to
allocate limited funds among the universe of capital cases. Were the same
jurisdiction to prosecute only a handful of capital cases each year, it would
be far more feasible to provide adequate funding for high-quality defense
counsel and investigation.243 Improved representation also enables the
adversarial process to weed out the marginal cases that are magnets for
error, conviction of the innocent, and arbitrariness. 244
VI. NARROWING BY THE COURT REDUX: VINDICATING STEWART AND
STEVENS
There is, then, much force to Justice Stevens's view that narrowing death
eligibility can moderate the problems that plague capital punishment in the
United States today. The question remains whether the Court as a whole is
prepared to follow the public, and reinvigorate and extend its less-is-better
jurisprudence of the 1970s and early the 1980s. Although the less-is-better
trend on the ground is promising, it probably is not sufficient by itself,
absent endorsement and enforcement by the Court, to tackle the most
significant remaining flaw in the administration of the capital justice
system: the states' ever-expanding lists of ever-more-broadly interpreted
capital eligibility factors.
In the last few years, public opinion has led the Court in a less-is-better
direction. Relying explicitly on recent trends in death penalty legislation,
prosecution, and jury verdicts, the Court recently overturned two of its own
decisions issued at the height of its more-is-better period. In Justice
241. See id. (detailing the effects of Indiana's recent increase in funding for defense
counsel in capital cases); supra notes 208, 212 and accompanying text (discussing the
increase in funding and other improvements in the provision of defense counsel in capital
cases in Illinois and Texas).
242. See Lefstein, supra note 222, at 532 ("Of all the problems involved in achieving
reform, probably none is more difficult than convincing legislators and other government
officials that adequate funding should be provided for the defense of capital cases.");
Lawrence C. Marshall, Gideon's Paradox, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 955, 961 (2004) (discussing
economic and political constraints on funding of counsel).
243. For examples of instances in which jurisdictions have declined to seek the death
penalty against a defendant because of the higher costs of bringing a capital case, see Russell
Gold, Counties Struggle with High Cost of Prosecuting Death Penalty Cases, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 9, 2002, at B1; Dave Maas, Some Counties Simply Can't Afford to Pursue Capital
Offense Cases, Ariz. Capital Times, May 25, 2001, at Al. See generally Ashley Rupp, Note,
Death Penalty Prosecutorial Charging Decisions and County Budgetary Restrictions: Is the
Death Penalty Arbitrarily Applied Based on County Funding?, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 2735,
(2003).
244. See Lefstein, supra note 222, at 526 ("Improved defense representation will reduce
the risk of conviction of persons genuinely innocent and of persons who, though guilty of the
offense, deserve to be spared the death penalty because of mitigating circumstances.").
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Stevens's opinion for the Court in Atkins v. Virginia,245 a six-person
majority concluded that the Eighth Amendment bars execution of the
mentally retarded, thereby overruling the Court's 1989 decision in Penry v.
Lynaugh.246 Three years later, in Roper v. Simmons,247 the Court overruled
its decision in Stanford v. Kentucky24 8 and held that the Constitution
prohibits execution of defendants who committed their crimes as
juveniles. 249 Most notable was the vote of Justice Kennedy, a long-time
adherent of Justice White's more-is-better approach,2 5 0 who nonetheless
joined Justice Stevens's decisions in Atkins, and was assigned by Justice
Stevens (the senior Justice in the majority) to write the decision in Roper.
Several other lines of recent cases also reveal a willingness on the
Court's part to scrutinize death sentences more vigorously, particularly in
cases falling near the mitigated circumference. Recently, for example, the
Court overturned three death verdicts due to ineffective assistance of
counsel, concluding that there was a "reasonable probability" that the
mitigating evidence trial counsel incompetently failed to discover would
have generated a sentence less than death. 25 1  To like effect are recent
decisions overturning instructions that discouraged jurors from giving full
weight to mitigating circumstances 252 and other decisions requiring jurors
245. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
246. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
247. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
248. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
249. See also In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 969-70 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting from
denial of original habeas corpus petition) (presaging much of the analysis in Roper in
arguing that the Court should grant an extraordinary writ in order to rule that the
Constitution bars the execution of individuals for crimes they committed as juveniles).
250. See, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993) (Kennedy, J.) (upholding a
procedure that limited the scope of a jury's consideration of mitigating circumstances).
251. See Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2468-69 (2005) (finding constitutionally
inadequate representation because, "[i]f the defense lawyers had looked in the file on
Rompilla's prior conviction, it is uncontested they would have found a range of mitigation
leads that no other source had opened up" which in turn would have revealed "a mitigation
case that bears no relation to the few naked pleas for mercy actually put before the jury");
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535 (2003) ("Given both the nature and the extent of the
abuse [Wiggins] suffered, we find there to be a reasonable probability that a competent
attorney, aware of this history, would have introduced it at sentencing in an admissible
form."); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398-99 (2000) (Stevens, J.) (concluding "that the
entire postconviction record, viewed as a whole and cumulative of mitigation evidence
presented originally, raised a reasonable probability that the result of the sentencing
proceeding would have been different if competent counsel had presented and explained the
significance of all the available evidence" (internal quotation omitted)). But cf Bell v. Cone,
535 U.S. 685, 702 (2002) (concluding, over Justice Stevens's dissent, that counsel's failure
to plead for the defendant's life at the capital-sentencing trial after having also failed to
investigate or introduce mitigating evidence was not constitutionally inadequate); Mickens
v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 164, 179 (2002) (holding, over Justice Stevens's dissent, that trial
counsel's conflict of interest-counsel had previously represented the woman the defendant
was charged with murdering-was not sufficiently prejudicial to the defendant to justify
overturning his capital sentence).
252. See supra notes 94-95, 163 and accompanying text (discussing the three decisions:
Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 48-49 (2004); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284-86 (2004);
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to be told that, in assessing whether the defendant will be a danger in the
future, they may consider state law assuring that defendants will be
sentenced to life without parole if they are not sentenced to death-factors
likely to prove decisive in close cases.253 The Court's recent decision
requiring a jury, not a judge, to find the statutory aggravating circumstance
that makes the defendant eligible for a death sentence may have a similar
effect, given the greater willingness of jurors than judges to spare the lives
of capital defendants. 254
In the current term, moreover, the Court will decide three cases in which
death row inmates seek retrials at which they can introduce newly
discovered evidence undermining the evidence of guilt or positively
suggesting they were innocent.255 The Court has also granted certiorari to
reconsider the propriety of state statutes mandating death when aggravation
net of mitigation is zero, i.e., when aggravation and mitigation are in
"equipoise." 256
Subject to recent changes in the make up of the Court with replacement
of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor with Chief Justice John
Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001)). But cf Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005)
(discussed supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text).
253. See decisions cited supra note 218.
254. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). On this point, Ring overruled
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-49 (1990)-a classic more-is-better decision by
Justice White on this and a number of other issues, see supra notes 132, 144-46 and
accompanying text-and adopted the position Justice Stevens had advocated in dissent.
Walton, 497 U.S. at 713 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). On the greater proclivity of judges
than jurors to impose death sentences, see Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 521 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, wrote a
strong dissent to the Court's 1984 decision approving the small minority of capital statutes
that assign judges, not juries, to decide whether to impose capital punishment. Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 490 (1984); see also Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 398 (1985)
(Steven, J., dissenting) (dissenting from a ruling upholding a judge's determination to
impose death under "guided discretion" procedures after receiving a recommendation of that
sentence from a jury instructed that death was the mandatory punishment for the offense).
255. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 34 (2005) (granting certiorari to review
State v. Holmes, 605 S.E.2d 19 (S.C. 2005), on the question whether the trial court
constitutionally barred a capital defendant on retrial from presenting evidence that another
man had repeatedly confessed to acquaintances that he committed the rape-murder with
which the defendant was charged); House v. Bell, 125 S. Ct. 2991 (2005) (granting certiorari
to review House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2004), including on the question, left open in
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), whether the Constitution bars the execution of a
prisoner who can make a convincing showing of his factual innocence based on newly
discovered evidence); Oregon v. Guzek, 125 S. Ct. 1929 (2005) (granting certiorari to
review State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106 (Or. 2004) on the question of whether a capital
defendant on retrial of the penalty phase may present evidence, some of it newly discovered,
that the chief witnesses against him at the guilt phase lied in testifying about the defendant's
guilt and level of culpability).
256. Kansas v. Marsh, 125 S. Ct. 2517 (2005). The Court granted certiorari to review the
decision in State v. Marsh, 102 P.3d 445 (Kan. 2004) on the question of whether Kansas
may constitutionally require jurors to impose death when aggravating and mitigating
circumstances are in "equipoise," and on the effect of Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639
(1990), which upheld an Arizona statute that state courts had interpreted to have an effect
similar to Kansas's equipoise provision. Id.
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Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, there is some reason to think that the
Court, tracking events on the ground, is resurrecting the Stewart-Stevens
brand of narrowing and abandoning Justice White's perilous quest for
numerousness. But to give the less-is-better approach the best chance of
addressing existing problems with the existing death penalty, the Court will
have to go further. In the manner of jujitsu, it will have to use the impetus
from the states' own less-is-better reforms to impel them to undertake
reforms they have thus far refused to adopt on their own, 257 namely, limits
on the number and breadth of statutory aggravating factors and other death-
eligibility criteria. As is demonstrated above, with Justice Stevens's
McCleskey dissent as the starting point, narrowed death-eligibility criteria
are a potent tool for curbing racial disparity, error, arbitrariness, and
resource drains. 258  Indeed, this was "the considered and unanimous
judgment" of the Illinois Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment-
the most thoughtful and thorough public study ever undertaken of the death
penalty in the United States:
[T]he number of eligibility factors in the Illinois death penalty scheme
need[s] to be reduced. The continued expansion of the list of eligibility
factors has placed significant burdens upon the criminal justice system, as
prosecutors and courts struggle to fairly apply the ever evolving list of
factors making a defendant eligible for the death penalty. The resulting
capital prosecutions have over-taxed the resources of the criminal justice
system, and, more important, reflect a degree of arbitrariness, when
decisions across the state are compared.259
Some eligibility factors are narrow enough already or may be politically
untouchable. (Murder of a police officer may be an example of both.) But
the elimination or diminution of other factors is feasible and a promising
response to problems with the existing capital system. As a majority of the
Illinois Governor's Commission and others have noted, an eligibility factor
that is particularly ripe for elimination or narrowing is the accompanying-
felony circumstance. 260 Virtually all of the thirty-seven states with current
death penalty statues make defendants eligible for death if a robbery,
burglary, rape, or other "assaultive" or "dangerous" felony in some manner
accompanied the killing. Yet, as a majority of the Illinois Commission
noted (in regard, it should be pointed out, to one of the narrowest versions
of this factor among the many used by the states), the inherent breadth of
this factor invites trouble:
The "course of a felony" eligibility factor, when originally enacted in
the 1977 Act, enumerated nine felonies which resulted in the potential for
death eligibility. The list of felonies contained in the ... factor has now
increased to fifteen. Despite the fact that [Illinois' version of] the...
257. See supra Part 1V.C.
258. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
259. See I11. Conmm'n on Capital Punishment, supra note 213, at 68.
260. See Blecker, supra note 227, at BI; Blecker & Liebman, supra note 2277.
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factor is narrowly drawn in terms of its requirement for actual
participation in the killing by the defendant and intent on the part of the
defendant, the long list of felonies included within its scope could make
almost any first degree murder eligible for the death penalty....
Since so many first degree murders are potentially death eligible under
this factor, it lends itself to disparate application throughout the state.
26 1
The disparity- and error-inviting breadth of this factor is even greater in
the typical death-sentencing jurisdiction which, unlike Illinois, does not
"require ... actual participation in the killing by the defendant" or "intent"
on the defendant's part. In some states, the felony-murder rule makes
capital eligible any participant in a fatal felony, potentially including
getaway drivers, unarmed defendants who unsuccessfully urged co-felons
not to use their weapons, 262 and accomplices in felonies that ended
tragically when a gun fired accidentally or when a bystander or police
officer fired an errant shot.263 The rule even sometimes applies to killings
committed in the heat of passion when no felony was contemplated-as
when a defendant, as an afterthought, escapes in the victim's car or takes a
ring he previously gave the victim.264
Matters are still worse in states that treat the accompanying felony both
as sufficient by itself to elevate unintentional homicide to first-degree
murder (the only degree of murder for which death is a possible
punishment) and as the single statutory aggravating factor needed to
261. See Ill. Comm'n on Capital Punishment, supra note 213, at 72.
262. See, e.g., White v. Dugger, 483 U.S. 1045, 1049 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (arguing that the Constitution should not permit a death sentence
for a defendant convicted of felony-murder who did not participate in the killing of the
victims, was not aware that accomplices intended to kill victims, and had previously voiced
opposition to killing anyone); State v. Hacker, 510 So.2d 304, 306 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(upholding a felony murder conviction when defendants fleeing scene of a robbery in a
vehicle collided with another vehicle causing the death of the driver of the other vehicle).
263. See People v. Hemandez, 624 N.E.2d 661, 662, 666 (N.Y. 1993) (finding defendants
liable for felony-murder based on fellow police officers' killing of an undercover officer
during a shootout following the defendants' robbery); People v. Caldwell, 681 P.2d 274, 281
(Cal. 1984) (upholding a felony-murder conviction where the "defendants' malicious
conduct of fleeing in a dangerous high-speed chase, confronting the officers with a
dangerous weapon when the chase ended and further preparing to shoot it out with the
deputies was a proximate cause of [the accomplice's] death"); State v. Baker, 607 S.W.2d
153, 156-57 (Mo. 1980) (finding the defendant responsible for the accomplice's death at the
hands of the intended victim); People v. Hickman, 319 N.E.2d 511, 512, 514 (Ill. 1974)
(upholding a felony-murder conviction of unarmed burglar because pursuing police officers
accidentally shot and killed a plain clothes detective from another jurisdiction who was also
pursuing the suspect).
264. See Franklin E. Zimring & James Zuehl, Victim Injury and Death in Urban
Robbery: A Chicago Study, 15 J. Legal Stud. 1, 31-36 (1986) (discussing the use of the
felony-murder rule to increase killings to murder and to establish accompanying-felony
aggravating circumstance for purposes of capital sentencing where evidence suggested that
defendant's taking of property was an afterthought to killings committed for other reasons);
see also State v. East, 481 S.E.2d 652, 664-65 (N.C. 1997) (concluding in dicta that the
accompanying-felony aggravating circumstance is satisfied by proof that the defendant stole
the keys to the victims' car for purposes of escape).
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"narrow" first-degree murder enough to make it death eligible. 265 In these
states the accompanying felony moves a crime that otherwise lies outside
the capital circle onto the circle's circumference (by making it first degree),
and then bootstraps the crime inside the circle (by making it "aggravated").
Some statutes even invite triple- and quadruple-dipping based on the
accompanying felony-as where a robbery (1) turns a manslaughter or
negligent homicide into first-degree murder, then (2) supplies the
accompanying-felony aggravating factor, then (3) provides the only factual
basis for other statutory aggravating factors, for example, that the defendant
killed the victim for "pecuniary gain," 266 or to "eliminate a witness" or
"avoid arrest" for the robbery. 267  Individually and as a whole, these
265. See, e.g., Jefferson v. State, 353 S.E.2d 468, 475 (Ga. 1987) (rejecting a challenge to
the constitutionality of the death sentence premised on an accompanying-felony aggravating
circumstance after the defendant was found guilty of capital murder on a felony-murder
theory); State v. Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d 127, 140-41 (Tenn. 1981) (approving use of a "during
the course of a felony" aggravating circumstance in a case in which the first-degree murder
conviction was based on a felony-murder theory); Rosen, supra note 62, at 1125-26 ("Some
states, several of which have large death row populations, are pure felony murder states; that
is, they allow the defendant to be sentenced to death solely because the killing took place
during an accompanying felony. A defendant first can be convicted of first-degree murder
because of the rule. The rule then is used again as an aggravating circumstance, unqualified
at either stage by any mens rea requirement."); id. at 1135 ("[D]efendants continue to be
sentenced to death solely because they committed a murder during the course of a felony...
.") (citing cases)); Zimring & Zuehl, supra note 264, at 31 (describing the use of the felony-
murder rule as a means of "automatic[ally] upgrading... any murder involving a robbery to
the status of first degree as well as . . . automatic[ally] inclu[ding] . . . the robbery as a
circumstance that generates eligibility for the death penalty"); see also Marc R. Shapiro, Re-
Evaluating the Role of the Jury in Capital Cases After Ring v. Arizona, 59 N.Y.U. Ann.
Surv. Am. L. 633, 660 (2004) (noting that "many [States'] statutory aggravating
circumstances [parallel] conduct included in the list of capital offenses," so that "the capital
defendant may have certain facts counted against her twice: once as an element in the
charged offense and again as an aggravating circumstance" (citing cases)). Among the
decisions ruling that there is no constitutional impediment to basing a death sentence on an
aggravating circumstance that duplicates an element of first-degree murder, including the
element of felony murder, are Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384, 1392-93 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989); McKenzie v. Risley, 842 F.2d 1525, 1539 n.30 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom McKenzie v. McCormick, 488 U.S. 901 (1988); Ritter v. Thigpen, 828 F.2d
662, 665 (11 th Cir. 1987); Wilson v. Butler, 813 F.2d 664, 673 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1079 (1988); Coral v. State, 628 So. 2d 954, 958 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)
(upholding a death sentence although the only aggravating circumstance overlapped an
element of the capital offense).
266. See Rosen, supra note 62, at 1131-32 ("Other[] [states] broadly construe [the
pecuniary gain aggravating factor] to include all felony murder cases where an underlying
motive for monetary gain exists, including all robbery murders and most burglary murders.
In these latter states, most felony murderers are automatically death eligible without any
further narrowing required because most felony murders occur during robberies or other
crimes committed for monetary gain.").
267. See, e.g., James Higgins, Avoiding Furman: The Unconstitutionality of Mississippi's
Killing to Avoid Arrest Aggravator, 39 U.S.F. L. Rev. 175, 190-94 (2004). Recently courts
in some states have taken steps to limit the double counting of aggravating circumstances,
such as the "accompanying felony" and "pecuniary gain" circumstances. Id. Elsewhere,
however, courts have been less vigilant in restricting the "duplicative" use of the
"accompanying felony" and "arrest avoidance" aggravating circumstances in the same case,
including when both are premised entirely on a felony murder that was previously used as
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permutations (and perversions) of the "accompanying felony" factor make
capital-eligible crimes out of thousands of homicides that, even apart from
mitigation, will never come close to the aggravated core. Even worse, these
statutory schemes then jawbone jurors into treating that single factor as
multiple reasons to sentence the offender to die. The opportunities for
discrimination, error, arbitrariness, and waste of resources are rife.
To date, state legislatures have not been willing to subtract or narrow
death-eligibility criteria as a way of repairing the death penalty. For
example, although the Illinois legislature enacted a bill incorporating many
of the recommendations of the Governor's Commission-many of them
likely to reduce the number of death sentences particularly in weak and
marginal cases 268-the Commission's call to truncate the state's list of
aggravating factors from twenty to five or at least to eliminate the
accompanying-felony factor was never seriously considered. 269 Nor have
state courts been willing to examine how broadly eligibility factors in the
state's statute are applied across the run of cases or whether factors such as
the basis for convicting the defendant of capital murder. Id. In Mississippi, for example, a
large proportion of capital murder convictions are based on felony murder, and "an
overwhelming number of capital murderers face the prospect of beginning their sentencing
phase with two aggravators," felony murder and (entirely as a result of the killing in the
course of a felony) arrest avoidance. Id.
268. In response to the recommendations of the Illinois Governor's Commission on
Capital Punishment, the Illinois legislature has enacted a number of criminal-justice reforms.
These include: (1) videotaping of all interrogations in homicide cases (725 111. Comp. Stat.
Ann. 5/103-2.1(b) (West Supp. 2005)); (2) a pilot project utilizing improved protocols for
eyewitness identification procedures (725 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/107A-5 (West Supp.
2005)); (3) a requirement for a pretrial reliability hearing before a jailhouse informant may
testify (725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/115-21(d) (West Supp. 2005)); (4) increased disclosure
requirements regarding potentially exculpatory evidence (725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/114-
5/123 (West Supp. 2005)); (5) a bar on any death sentences based on the uncorroborated
testimony of a jailhouse informant or a single eyewitness (720 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/9-1(h-
5) (West Supp. 2005)); (6) decertification of police found to have perjured themselves in
murder cases (50 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 705/6.1(h) (West 2005)); (7) defense access to a
DNA database to seek out alternative suspects (725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/116-5 (West
Supp. 2005)); (8) increased funding for defense investigations in capital cases (725 Ill.
Comp. Stat. Ann. 105/10 (West Supp. 2005)); (9) removal of several factors that had
previously rendered a defendant eligible for the death penalty (720 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/9-
l(b) (West Supp. 2005); (10) additions to the list of mitigating factors that must be
considered by a jury in capital sentencing hearings (720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/9-1(c) (West
Supp. 2005)); (11) changes in the statute that clarify the jury's right not to impose a sentence
of death (720 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/9-1(g) (West Supp. 2005)); and (12) a requirement that
the state supreme court reverse any death sentence that it deems fundamentally unjust (720
I11. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/9-1(i) (West Supp. 2005)). See Robert Warden, Illinois Death
Penalty Reform: How It Happened, What It Promises, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 381
(2005); Associated Press, Illinois Reforms System for Death Penalty, Wash. Post, Nov. 20,
2003, at All; Press Release, Illinois Governor's Office, Governor Ryan Introduces Death
Penalty Reform Legislation: Calls On General Assembly To Hold Hearings With Key
Parties (May 13, 2002), available at
http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/ShowPressRelease.cfm?SubjectlD=39RecNum= l773.
269. See Thomas P. Sullivan, Preventing Wrongful Convictions-A Current Report from
Illinois, 52 Drake L. Rev. 605, 611 (2004) ("The Illinois legislature tinkered with language,
but made no substantive changes to the all-encompassing list of factors .... ).
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the "accompanying felony" circumstance have been stretched beyond
recognition across the board or in particular outlier cases.270
The states are not entirely to blame. In each of these respects-flabby or
elastically interpreted aggravating factors, a refusal to examine the pattern
of all applications of particular factors, and the denial of comparative
proportionality review-state legislatures and courts have drawn support
from the Supreme Court's more-is-better decisions of the 1980s and
1990s. 271 The other side of the coin, however, is that in each respect, state
legislatures and courts can find blueprints for needed less-is-better reforms
in concurring and dissenting opinions authored or joined by Justice Stevens.
If the states fail to adopt these reforms, the Court itself should elevate to
law those dissenting (or in some cases separately concurring) views, by (1)
tightening constitutional limits on factors that can qualify as aggravating
and how broadly they may be defined,272 (2) disallowing double counting
of aggravating factors, 273 (3) requiring sentencers before imposing death to
find a substantial balance of aggravation net of mitigation,274 and (4)
expanding the extent of constitutionally mandated capital appellate review
to include comparative proportionality analysis275 and examination of the
pattern of each factor's application across the run of all cases. 276
270. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 187.
271. See supra Part III.C.
272. See, e.g., Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 480 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting,
joined by Stevens, J.); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 861 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("The sentencer's unguided consideration of victim impact evidence thus
conflicts with the principle central to our capital punishment jurisprudence that, 'where
discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether
a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited
so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."' (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976))); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 803-04 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.) (concluding "that the Arizona Supreme
Court has [not] placed constitutionally sufficient limitations on its 'especially heinous... or
depraved' aggravating circumstance"); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 692 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.) (arguing that Arizona's "body of case law"
does not "articulate[] a construction of the [heinousness and related] aggravating
circumstance that is coherent and consistent, and that meaningfully limits the range of
homicides to which the aggravating factor will apply").
273. See, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 258 (1988) (Marshall, J, dissenting,
joined by Stevens, J.) ("[T]he application of the Louisiana sentencing scheme ... where
there is a complete overlap between aggravating circumstances found at the sentencing
phase and elements of the offense previously found at the guilt phase, violates constitutional
principles in ways that will inevitably tilt the sentencing scales toward the imposition of the
death penalty.").
274. See, e.g., Walton, 497 U.S. at 683-84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens,
J.); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 405-06 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by
Stevens, J.); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 323-24 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Smith v. North Carolina, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982) (Stevens, J., respecting the
denial of certiorari).
275. See, e.g., Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 54 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("While the cases relied upon by respondent do not establish that comparative
proportionality review is a constitutionally required element of a capital sentencing system, I
believe the case law does establish that appellate review plays an essential role in
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Justice Stevens suggested these needed reforms in his recent speech to
the American Bar Association 277-in each case criticizing practices the
Court has endorsed (over his dissent) that encourage death sentences in
marginal cases. 278 The Court should (1) no longer allow jurors to premise
death sentences on omnipresent "victim impact" evidence, (2) forbid states
to exclude from service on capital juries people who have doubts about the
death penalty but are not unalterably opposed to imposing it,279 (3) overturn
rules in Alabama and elsewhere allowing elected judges to "override"
lawful jury verdicts that declined to impose death,280 and (4) take greater
precautions against executing the innocent.281
CONCLUSION: NARROWING VERSUS NOTHING
The narrowing Justice Stevens has promoted has an additional virtue
from the Court's perspective. The approach enables the Justices to take
meaningful action to address problems with the death penalty-problems
several of them have gone out of their way to address in their rare public
speeches 282-without requiring them to take the more controversial step of
declaring the penalty unconstitutional.
eliminating the systemic arbitrariness and capriciousness which infected death penalty
schemes invalidated by [Furman], and hence that some form of meaningful appellate review
is constitutionally required.").
276. See, e.g., Arave, 507 U.S. at 488 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.).
277. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
279. Compare Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 435 (1985), with id. at 436-37 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
280. Compare Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515 (1995) (majority opinion) ("The
Constitution . . . is .. .not offended when a State . . . requires the sentencing judge to
consider a jury's recommendation and trusts the judge to give it the proper weight [without
any standards to guide that decision]."), with id. at 525 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Aln
unfettered judicial override of a jury verdict for life imprisonment cannot be taken to
represent the judgment of the community. A penalty that fails to reflect the community's
judgment that death is the appropriate sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
under our reasoning in Gregg.").
281. Compare Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (expressing doubt whether a
capital prisoner's factual innocence is a basis for habeas corpus relief from his death
sentence), with id. at 435 (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ., dissenting) ("I
believe it contrary to any standard of decency to execute someone who is actually innocent.
. [and thus] that petitioner may raise an Eighth Amendment challenge to his punishment on
the ground that he is actually innocent." (citations omitted)).
282. See Joan Biskupic & Fred Barbash, Retired Justice Lewis Powell Dies At 90, Wash.
Post, Aug. 26, 1998, at Al ("[Justice Powell] was the author of a 1987 five-justice ruling
rejecting arguments that a state's capital punishment system be struck down because
statistics suggested blacks were more likely to get the death penalty than whites. He said he
regretted that decision and declared that he had come to think that capital punishment should
be abolished."); Charles Lane, O'Connor Expresses Death Penalty Doubt: Justice Says
Innocent May Be Killed, Wash. Post, Jul. 4, 2001, at Al ("Speaking to a meeting of
Minnesota Women Lawyers in Minneapolis, O'Connor said that 'serious questions are being
raised' about the death penalty. Noting that 90 death row inmates have been exonerated...
since 1973, she said that 'the system may well be allowing some innocent defendants to be
executed."'); Associated Press, Justice Backs Death Penalty Freeze, CBS News, Apr. 10,
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The idea of providing the Court with a pragmatic avenue to limit the
death penalty without invalidating it outright was central to Justice
Stevens's dissent in McCleskey. When McCleskey was before the Court,
there was a widespread sense that the future of capital punishment was in
the balance. It was widely assumed that any ruling by the Court endorsing
the use of statistics to show that a state's capital sentencing scheme was
race based would inevitably lead to outright abolition of the penalty. 283 The
Court was unwilling to go that far. Justice Stevens sought to make the
choice less binary, by assuring his colleagues that they could tackle racial
disparities without immunizing the "worst of the worst" cases from the
ultimate sanction.
Narrowing death-eligibility factors also makes the available responses to
the problem of innocence less binary. Capital punishment need not present
a choice of either accepting the execution of the innocent and those
undeserving of death or eliminating the death penalty altogether.
Narrowing provides a means to satisfy those who remain adamant about
preserving a death penalty while still taking significant steps to reduce the
likelihood of the most serious miscarriages of justice.
A critical message of Justice Stevens's death penalty jurisprudence is that
narrowing death eligibility is an important incremental step that remains
open to the states and the Court. Those committed to enhancing the
fairness and accuracy of the capital justice system should take this lesson to
heart. Justice Stevens has not hidden his personal view that "this country
would be much better off if we did not have capital punishment .... I really
think it's a very unfortunate part of our judicial system and I would feel
much, much better if more states would really consider whether they think
2001, http://www.CBSnews.com/stories/2001/04/1 0/deathpenalty/main284850.shtml
("Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg supports a proposed state moratorium on the death penalty,
saying that accused murderers with good lawyers 'do not get the death penalty.' Ginsburg
criticized the often 'meager' amount of money spent to defend poor people, [stating that she]
would be 'glad to see' Maryland become the second state after Illinois to pass a moratorium
on imposition of the death penalty. 'I have yet to see a death case among the dozens coming
to the Supreme Court on eve-of-execution stay applications in which the defendant was well
represented at trial ....'); supra note 108, infra note 284 and accompanying text (quoting
and discussing Justice Stevens's public comments on two separate occasions expressing
doubts about the reliability of the administration of the death penalty in the United States);
see also Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145-56 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari) (cataloguing defects in the current administration of the death
penalty as reason for his decision thereafter to dissent from all of the Court's decisions
imposing the death penalty).
283. See Callins, 510 U.S. at 1155-57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari) ("[S]ince McCleskey, I have come to wonder whether there was truth in the
majority's suggestion that discrimination and arbitrariness could not be purged from the
administration of capital punishment without sacrificing the equally essential component of
fairness-individualized sentencing."); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 367 (1987)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court's decision appears to be based on a fear that the




the benefits outweigh the very serious potential injustice. 284  But even
those who believe that "none is best" can recognize that "less is better."
284. Abdon M. Pallasch, High Court Justice: U.S. Would Be Better Off Without Death
Penalty, Chi. Sun Times, May 12, 2004, at 12.
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APPENDIX
Table 1 285 The Fifteen U.S. Counties with Fifty or More Death Verdicts
from 1973 to 1995: Comparison of Rates of Reversible Error and of
Capitally Sentenced Defendants Later Found Not Guilty in Counties with
High and Low Death-Sentencing Rates
High Death-Sentencing Counties
County (City), Death Homi- Death Error # %
State Verdicts cides Verdicts / Rate Not Not
1000 Guilty Guilty
Homicides
Pima (Tucson), 63 986 64 71% 1 1.6
AZ
Clark (LasVegas), 71 1,288 55 64% 2 2.8
NV
Pinellas (St. 51 1,018 50 89% 0 0
Petersburg), FL
Okla. (City), OK 68 1,361 50 75% 3 4.4
Maricopa 114 2,782 41 84% 5 4.4
(Phoenix), AZ
Hillsborough 67 1,839 36 72% 0 0
(Tampa), FL
All 6 Counties 434 9,274 47 76% 11 2.5
avg.
-VS. -
285. This table and the two that follow are from Liebman et al., supra note 188, at 291
tbl.10B, 294 tbl.13A, 295 tbl.13B, 297 tbl.14A, 298 tbl.14B. In each of these tables, death
verdicts, homicides, and death-sentencing rates ((death verdicts/homicides) x 1000) are
those occurring during the portion of the 1973-1995 period when the state in which the
county is located had a valid post-Funnan capital statute. Error rates are the overall capital




County (City), State Death Homi- Death Error # %
Verdicts cides Verdicts / Rate Not Not
1000 Guilty Guilty
Homicides
Duval (Jacksonville), 66 2,232 30 51% 0 0
FL
Philadelphia, PA 127 4,698 27 25% 0 0
Jefferson 55 2,161 25 55% 0 0
(Birmingham), AL
Broward (Ft. 55 2,599 21 84% 2 3.6
Lauderdale), FL
Harris (Houston), TX 190 9,829 19 32% 2 1.1
Dade (Miami), FL 103 6,936 15 67% 1 .9
Cook (Chicago), IL 138 12,586 11 57% 8 5.8
Dallas, TX 61 5,682 11 67% 1 1.6
Los Angeles, CA 150 17,998 8 37% 0 0
All 9 Counties 945 64,721 15 53% 14 1.5
avg.
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Table 2. Death-Sentencing Counties with 950-1400 Homicides, 1973-
1995: Comparison of Rates of Reversible Error and of Capitally Sentenced
Defendants Later Found Not Guilty in Counties with High and Low Death-
Sentencing Rates 286
Counties with Death-Sentencing Rates in the Top Third ofAll U.S. Death-
Sentencing Counties
County (City), Death Homi- Death Error # %
State Verdicts / cides Verdicts Rate Not Not
1000 Guilty Guilty
Homicides
Pima (Tucson), 64 986 63 71% 1 1.6
AZ
Clark (Las 55 1,288 71 64% 2 2.8
Vegas), NV
Pinellas (St. 50 51 89% 0 0
Petersburg), FL 1,018
Oklahoma (City), 50 68 75% 3 4.4
OK 1,361




286. In Tables 2 and 3, high death-sentencing counties are the eighty-one counties (the
top one-third), among the 244 U.S. counties with five or more death verdicts during the
1973-1995 study period, that had the highest rates of death verdicts to homicides. The lowest
death-sentencing counties are the eighty-one counties (bottom one-third) among the same
244 counties that had the lowest rates of death verdicts to homicides. To assure statistical
comparability, this and the next table compare only those counties within the two cohorts
that had like numbers of homicides during the study period. In this table, the comparison is
among counties with between 950 and 1400 homicides during the study period. In Table 3,
the comparison is among counties with 200 to 700 homicides during that period.
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LESS IS BETTER
Counties with Death-Sentencing Rates in the Bottom Third ofAll U.S.
Death-Sentencing Counties
County (City), State Death Homi- Death Error # %
Verdicts / cides Verdicts Rate Not Not
1000 Guilty Guilty
Homicides
DeKalb (suburban 17 1,065 18 100% 0 0
Atlanta), GA
Fresno, CA 14 1,256 18 40% 0 0
Mecklenburg 14 1,013 14 64% 0 0
(Charlotte), NC
Santa Clara (San 13 1,161 15 22% 0 0
Jose), CA
Jefferson 12 1,201 15 53% 0 0
(Louisville), KY
Allegheny 12 1,145 14 64% 0 0
(Pittsburgh), PA
Travis (Austin), TX 10 975 10 44% 0 0
Contra Costa, CA 9 1,015 9 0% 0 0
Pulaski (Little 7 1,157 8 60% 0 0
Rock), AR
Davidson 6 1,323 8 29% 0 0
(Nashville), TN
Prince George's 6 1,074 6 50% 0 0
(sub. Washington),
MD
Richmond, VA 5 1,071 5 17% 0 0
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Table 3. Death-Sentencing Counties with 200-700 Homicides, 1973-1995:
Comparison of Rates of Reversible Error and of Capitally Sentenced
Defendants Later Found Not Guilty in Counties with High and Low Death-
Sentencing Rates
Counties with Death-Sentencing Rates in the Top Third ofAll U.S. Death-
Sentencing Counties
County (City), Death Homi- Death Error # %
State Verdicts / cides Verdicts Rate Not Not
1000 Guilty Guilty
Homicides
Pasco (suburban 72 279 20 100% 2 10
Tampa-St.
Petersburg), FL
Robeson 62 340 21 76% 0 0
(Lumberton), NC
Baltimore County 56 612 34 100% 1 2.9
(suburbs), MD
Bay (Panama City), 55 238 13 83% 0 0
FL
Escambia 55 513 28 87% 1 3.6
(Pensacola), FL
Horry (Myrtle 54 261 14 82% 0 0
Beach), SC
Brevard 50 482 24 54% 1 4.2
(Melbourne), FL
Volusia (Daytona 49 546 27 44% 0 0
Beach), FL






Counties with Death-Sentencing Rates in the Bottom Third ofAll U.S.
Death-Sentencing Counties
County (City), Death Homi- Death Error # %
State Verdicts/ cides Verdicts Rate Not Not
1000 Guilty Guilty
Homicides
Lauderdale, MS 20 246 5 80% 0 0
Lucas (Toledo), 20 498 10 17% 0 0
OH
Lubbock, TX 20 609 12 60% 0 0
Buncombe 19 259 5 50% 0 0
(Asheville), NC
Lafayette, LA 19 265 5 25% 0 0
Jefferson (Pine 18 327 6 100% 0 0
Bluff), AR
Ventura, CA 18 545 10 14% 0 0
Brazoria, TX 18 273 5 33% 0 0
Cumberland 18 602 11 63% 1 9
(Fayetteville), NC
Calcasieu (Lake 18 330 6 100% 0 0
Charles), LA
Knox (Knoxville), 18 499 9 100% 0 0
TN
Clayton (suburban 18 279 5 80% 0 0
Atlanta), GA
Seminole 18 335 6 33% 1 17
(Orlando), FL
Virginia Beach, 18 335 6 0% 0 0
VA
St. Lucie, FL 18 395 7 71% 0 0
Wichita (Falls), TX 17 287 5 80% 0 0
Santa Barbara, CA 17 287 5 0% 0 0
Douglas (Omaha), 17 658 11 68% 0 0
NE
Franklin 16 497 8 17% 0 0
(Columbus), OH
Fayette 16 315 5 40% 0 0
(Lexington), KY
Tulare, CA 16 515 8 25% 0 0
Bell (Killeen), TX 15 388 6 67% 0 0




County (City), Death Homi- Death Error # %
State Verdicts/ cides Verdicts Rate Not Not
1000 Guilty Guilty
Homicides
Spartenburg, SC 15 453 7 50% 0 0
Gaston (Gastonia), 14 347 5 33% 0 0
NC
Gregg (Longview), 14 348 5 75% 0 0
TX
Bibb (Macon), GA 13 595 8 56% 0 0
Fairfax (suburban 13 376 5 14% 0 0
Washington), VA
Hidalgo (McAllen), 12 409 5 50% 0 0
TX
Delaware 12 491 6 0% 0 0
(suburban
Philadelphia), PA
Greenville, SC 11 555 6 40% 0 0
Camden, NJ 11 559 6 100% 0 0
Guilford, NC 11 564 6 60% 0 0
Galveston, TX 11 664 7 44% 0 0
Richland 9 634 6 40% 0 0
(Columbia), SC
Salt Lake, UT 8 655 5 20% 0 0
All 36 Counties 15 15,782 239 48% 2 .8
(avg. (avg. avg.
438) 6.6)
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